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Article 
Clerk and Justice: The Ties That Bind John Paul 
Stevens and Wiley B. Rutledge  
LAURA KRUGMAN RAY 
Justice John Paul Stevens, now starting his thirty-third full term on the 
Supreme Court, served as law clerk to Justice Wiley B. Rutledge during the 
Court’s 1947 Term.  That experience has informed both elements of 
Stevens’s jurisprudence and aspects of his approach to his institutional 
role.  Like Rutledge, Stevens has written powerful opinions on issues of 
individual rights, the Establishment Clause, and the reach of executive 
power in wartime.  Stevens has also, like Rutledge, been a frequent author 
of dissents and concurrences, choosing to express his divergences from the 
majority rather than to vote in silence.  Within his chambers, Stevens has 
in many ways adopted his own clerkship experience in preference to 
current models.  Unlike the practices of most of his colleagues, Stevens 
hires fewer clerks, writes his own first drafts, and shares certiorari 
decisionmaking with his clerks.  The links between Stevens and Rutledge 
suggest that a Supreme Court clerkship of a single year may be a 
significant influence when a clerk becomes, a generation later, a Supreme 
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Clerk and Justice: The Ties That Bind John Paul 
Stevens and Wiley B. Rutledge  
LAURA KRUGMAN RAY ∗  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court law clerk, once a shadowy figure who served for 
modest pay as a Justice’s legal factotum, has recently moved into the 
spotlight.  Clerks have featured prominently—and sometimes 
controversially—as sources for two insider accounts of the Court,1 as 
major characters in several legal thrillers,2 as the subject of two recent 
book-length academic studies,3 and as recipients of quarter-million dollar 
signing bonuses from law firms eager to profit from their aura.4  Most 
dramatically, in the fall of 2005 a former law clerk replaced his Justice, 
himself a former law clerk, as Chief Justice of the United States.  John 
Roberts appeared most poignantly in his dual role when he stood on the 
steps of the Court building as pallbearer for Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist and nominee for his own Supreme Court seat.5 
Roberts is neither the first law clerk turned Justice nor the only current 
member of the Court with that history.  In fact, he is the fifth former clerk 
to be appointed to the Court, joining two colleagues, John Paul Stevens and 
Stephen Breyer, who themselves served as clerks—Stevens to Wiley B. 
Rutledge and Breyer to Arthur Goldberg.6  Nor is this the first time that 
three Justices, a third of the bench, have been former clerks.  From 1975 to 
1993, Byron White, Rehnquist, and Stevens shared that distinction, White 
as a former clerk for Chief Justice Fred Vinson and Rehnquist for 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law.  Ph.D., J.D., Yale University; A.B., Bryn 
Mawr College.  I am grateful to Jean Eggen, Alan Garfield, and Philip Ray for their helpful readings of 
earlier drafts of this article. 
1 EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC 
STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE 
BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979). 
2 See, e.g., PAUL LEVINE, 9 SCORPIONS (1998); BRAD MELTZER, THE TENTH JUSTICE (1997). 
3 TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE 
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID K. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ 
APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006).  
4 See David Lat, The Supreme Court’s Bonus Babies, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2007, at A19, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (“Most of these [Supreme Court] clerks will join elite 
private law firms.  This is not surprising, since firms entice them with signing bonuses that are expected 
to reach $250,000 this year.”). 
5 See Linda Greenhouse, Bush and First Lady Visit Rehnquist’s Coffin at Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 7, 2005, at A14, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.  For the accompanying 
photograph, see JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE (2007) (facing 184).  
6 See PEPPERS, supra note 3, at 130, 167. 
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Associate Justice Robert Jackson.7  Yet Roberts does hold a noteworthy 
distinction as the first third-generation law clerk named to the Court, the 
third link in a chain of conservative Justices stretching back to the 
polarized Roosevelt Court. 
This record of clerks turned Justices is scarcely surprising.  A Supreme 
Court clerkship has long been a sought after position for high achieving 
law school graduates.  Even in the days when clerks had significantly more 
limited duties, it was a valuable credential in launching an ambitious legal 
career—the kind that might possibly lead back to the high court.  Many 
former clerks remain close to their Justices and interested in the work of 
the institution, even if they do not go on, as Roberts did, to build careers as 
advocates before the Court.  The clerkship has become a badge of honor, 
always included in law firm and law school faculty biographies, as well as 
a convenient shorthand for academic success and professional distinction.  
It seems a safe prediction that Roberts will not be the last former clerk to 
join the Court, or even the last former clerk to take the seat of his or her 
Justice. 
The question that to date has sparked the most interest in the 
relationship between Justices and clerks is the degree of influence that the 
latter may have on the former.  Over fifty years ago, William Rehnquist, 
fresh from his own clerkship on the Supreme Court, wrote a piece for U.S. 
News & World Report suggesting that the Court’s predominantly left-
leaning clerks of his generation might well be swaying their Justices’ votes 
in the certiorari process.8  Forty years later, another former clerk, Edward 
Lazarus, stirred controversy by claiming that some Justices on the Court 
were particularly vulnerable to jurisprudential manipulation by their 
clerks.9  The return of former clerks to the Court has, however, inverted 
that question to raise a more challenging variation: the influence that a 
clerkship may have on the judicial performance of a Justice.   
The example of Justice Rutledge and Justice Stevens offers a 
particularly intriguing field for study.  Although the pairing is in some 
respects imbalanced—Rutledge served for only six full terms before his 
untimely death, while Stevens is currently serving his thirty-third full 
                                                                                                                          
7 See id. at 125, 138. 
8 William H. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Dec. 13, 1957, 74–75.  After rejecting the likelihood of clerk influence on the Justices’ opinions, 
Rehnquist argues that “no such clean bill of health is possible” for the cert process, where Justices are 
more reliant on clerks’ research.  Id. at 75.  He finds it “fair to say that the political cast of the clerks as 
a group was to the ‘left’ of either the nation or the Court,” what he describes as “the political 
philosophy now espoused by the Court under Chief Justice Warren.”  Id.  Based on his own experience 
as a clerk, he concludes that “[t]here is the possibility of the bias of clerks affecting the Court’s 
certiorari work.”  Id. 
9 Lazarus asserts that “[t]he temptation” for manipulation by clerks “was (and remains) especially 
great at the political center of the Court, in the chambers of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, both of 
whom are susceptible to clerks’ arguments and delegate to them almost all the opinion drafting and 
doctrine crunching.”  LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 274.  
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term—it nonetheless reveals the ways in which a clerkship of a single year 
may affect not only the future jurisprudence but also the institutional 
behavior of a clerk turned Justice. 
II.  WILEY B. RUTLEDGE  
A.  The Man 
Wiley Blount Rutledge was Franklin Roosevelt’s eighth and final 
appointment to the Supreme Court.  From the moment he joined the Court 
in February 1943, Rutledge became a reliable vote for positions supporting 
individual constitutional rights, particularly those protected by the First 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.  When Rutledge died of a 
massive stroke only six years later, his seat was filled by Sherman Minton, 
one of the Court’s least illustrious Justices and no supporter of expansive 
constitutional readings.  Yet Rutledge has remained, until recently, an 
overlooked figure; it was not until 2004 that the first serious biography 
appeared.  The account of that book’s genesis by its author, John Ferren, 
suggests the paucity of scholarship about Rutledge.  Seeking a subject for 
“a complete biography of someone in our national political life,” Ferren 
settled on Rutledge as a promising choice in part because “it was clear . . . 
[that] the [J]ustice and his service on the Supreme Court during the 1940s 
had not received comprehensive study.”10  Aside from the Ferren 
biography, the most valuable assessments of Rutledge are contained in two 
essays by former law clerks, Louis Pollak11 and, not surprisingly, John 
Paul Stevens.12 
Rutledge’s personal history reveals a somewhat bumpy and 
unconventional road to the Court.13  He was born in 1894 in Kentucky, the 
son of a Baptist minister and a mother who died when he was nine of 
tuberculosis, a disease he too would later contract.  After majoring in Latin 
and Greek at a small Tennessee college, he transferred to the University of 
Wisconsin for his senior year, switching his major to chemistry in the hope 
of improving his employment prospects.  Apparently no scientist—his 
                                                                                                                          
10 JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE 
WILEY RUTLEDGE 543 (2004).  Ferren consulted Harvard professor Andrew Kaufman, author of a 
highly regarded biography of Justice Cardozo, and Dr. David Wigdor of the Library of Congress’s 
Manuscript Division.  Id.  The only earlier biography, Justice Rutledge and the Bright Constellation, 
published in 1965 by Fowler Harper, a colleague of his subject at the University of Iowa Law School, 
did not attempt the detailed analytic examination of Rutledge’s life and jurisprudence that Ferren’s 
book provides. 
11 Louis H. Pollak, Wiley Blount Rutledge: Profile of a Judge, in SIX JUSTICES ON CIVIL RIGHTS 
177 (Ronald D. Rotunda ed., 1983). 
12 John Paul Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in MR. JUSTICE 177 (Allison Dunham & Philip B. 
Kurland eds., 1956).  
13 The following account draws heavily on Ferren’s biography of Justice Rutledge.  See FERREN, 
supra note 10. 
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chemistry grades were poor enough to require a summer “makeup course” 
for graduation—Rutledge changed his career plans once again.14  He 
enrolled in law school at Indiana University, at the same time teaching 
high school to pay his expenses.  The double burden proved untenable; 
Rutledge dropped out of law school and was teaching high school when he 
was diagnosed with tuberculosis, requiring a prolonged stay at a North 
Carolina sanatorium.  When sufficiently recovered, Rutledge returned to 
teaching, this time in the more salubrious climate of Albuquerque, before 
moving on to Boulder, Colorado, where he successfully balanced a 
teaching job with law school, graduating in 1922.  After a brief stint of law 
practice, he joined the University of Colorado law school faculty in 1924, 
teaching a broad range of courses until he was invited to join the faculty of 
Washington University in St. Louis two years later.  At Washington 
University he taught corporate law courses before becoming dean in 1931 
and then accepting the deanship of the University of Iowa College of Law 
four years later.  Although an academic like fellow Roosevelt appointees 
Felix Frankfurter and William O. Douglas, Rutledge did not match their 
record of distinguished scholarship.15  When Roosevelt named him to the 
Supreme Court in 1943, following four years on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the President seemed more 
impressed by the political value of Rutledge’s assorted residences west of 
the Mississippi River: “Wiley,” Roosevelt reportedly said, “you have a lot 
of geography.”16 
If Rutledge was not a distinguished scholar, he had other virtues that 
contributed to, and sometimes conflicted with, his work on the Court.  As a 
professor and dean, he was always available to his students not only to 
discuss course-related matters but also to provide advice and assistance for 
                                                                                                                          
14 Id. at 30.   
15 According to Ferren, “Wiley Rutledge was not a productive scholar during his academic life.  
His duties as dean, his love of people more than the library, and his difficulty in writing analytic prose 
all kept him from legal writing.  Of these, probably the last was the main reason he wrote so little . . . .”  
Id. at 98.  Jeffrey D. Hockett suggests another reason.  He notes that Rutledge suffers from comparison 
with some of his celebrated fellow Justices, Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson: “The lack of 
scholarly interest in Rutledge also stems from the fact that he had neither the ‘intellectual firepower’ of 
these men nor their felicity of expression.”  Jeffrey D. Hockett, Book Review, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
305, 305 (2005) (reviewing JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE 
STORY OF WILEY RUTLEDGE (2004)) (citation omitted).  Willard Wirtz, who was recruited by Rutledge 
as a junior faculty member at Iowa, has summarized Rutledge’s limited scholarship and attributed it to 
the time he chose to spend with his students: 
No treatise or casebook bears the Rutledge name.  His contributions to the law 
reviews were less than those of most of his colleagues.  There are only two “leading 
articles” and one unusually illuminating book review to bear witness to what his 
contributions to record scholarship would have been if he had, as teacher, chosen 
differently.  So it was not as a scholar, measured by writings, that Wiley Rutledge 
achieved his academic stature.   
W. Willard Wirtz, Teacher of Men, 25 IND. L.J. 444, 445 (1950).  
16 FERREN, supra note 10, at 219 (citation omitted). 
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more personal concerns.17  He was also an active participant in the larger 
community; in both St. Louis and Iowa City he was a member of civic and 
professional organizations, a frequent public speaker, and an activist 
supporting such controversial causes as a proposed constitutional 
amendment regulating child labor and Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan.18   
A man with a wide circle of friends, at the Court he continued to welcome 
visitors to his chambers for lengthy conversations, often delaying the start 
of his opinion work.19  And opinion writing did not come easily to him; 
even after four years on the circuit court, he described the process to 
another judge as “extremely hard.”20  Unlike his colleagues, who generally 
addressed only the issues pertinent to their resolution of a case, Rutledge 
felt an obligation to assure counsel that he had considered all the 
arguments they raised.  As he told one of his law clerks, “however foolish 
or trivial his arguments, I want them to know that I heard him.”21    
Rutledge’s biographer reports, based on interviews with the Justice’s law 
clerks, that Rutledge not only wrote his own opinions but did his own 
background research as well.  Justice Stevens recalled Rutledge “regularly 
taking home ‘chunks of the record’” to review and “in a First Amendment 
obscenity case Rutledge had not relied only on the cert petition, clerk’s 
memorandum, and briefs.  ‘He read the book.’”22 
The consequence of this diligence was sometimes opinions more 
admired for their thoroughness than for their effectiveness.  Ferren 
describes a typical Rutledge opinion as having “the features not of a 
narrowly focused, accelerating argument toward an irresistible conclusion, 
but of a law review article that painstakingly explored the alternatives 
before eventually yielding a result.”23  When assigning cases, Ferren 
suggests, senior members of the Court (principally Chief Justices Stone 
and Vinson and Justice Black) had reason to pass over Rutledge out of 
concern that his opinion would be excessively long, slow in coming, and 
                                                                                                                          
17 See id. at 111–13 (“Dean Rutledge did not limit his interactions with students outside class to 
problem solving.  He was easily accessible for any reason . . . .”). 
18 Id. at 68, 72–74, 128–30. 
19 See id. at 230–31 (describing a typical work day for Rutledge).  John Frank has suggested the 
toll taken on Rutledge by his many friends: 
Almost every mature law professor in the United States called him friend. After the 
war, an army of these friends kept up a constant flow of visits to the Justice at the 
Court.  I plead my share of guilt.  There were no appointments required, and there 
were no time limitations; Rutledge’s days were nibbled away in little bites of auld 
lang syne. 
John P. Frank, Book Review, 18 STAN. L. REV. 274, 277 (1965) (reviewing FOWLER V. HARPER, 
JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND THE BRIGHT CONSTELLATION (1965)).  
20 FERREN, supra note 10, at 230 (citation omitted). 
21 Id.  According to Ferren, “Rutledge was fond of saying that a losing litigant never complained 
that the opinion was too long.”  Id. 
22 Id. (citation omitted).  See also PEPPERS, supra note 3, at 138 (describing Rutledge and Black as 
Justices who “reviewed the original records and briefs . . . closely”).   
23 FERREN, supra note 10, at 200. 
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broader in scope than other like-minded Justices were prepared to accept.24   
Even Rutledge’s strong admirers had reservations about his work.  
Attorney General Francis Biddle, reviewing Court candidates for President 
Roosevelt, found Rutledge “the most promising” in the field but noted that 
“[h]e was apt to be long-winded” in his circuit court opinions.25  Even a 
law clerk from his final Court Term, federal judge Louis H. Pollak, in an 
appreciative essay about Rutledge’s civil rights jurisprudence, described 
him as “rarely eloquent” and some of his opinions as “too long and 
discursive for maximum impact.”26     
Rutledge was, it appears, a victim of his virtues.  Sociable by nature 
and a loyal friend, he increased the burden of his Court work by spending 
hours with visitors that might otherwise have speeded up his judicial 
labors.  A conscientious and meticulous drafter, he tended to blunt the 
force of his opinions with copious detail and extraneous issues.  These 
work habits may also have contributed to his early death, at the age of 
fifty-five, after only six Terms on the Court.27  If Rutledge was not ideally 
suited by temperament to the particular constraints of the Court—he 
reportedly talked at times of returning to academia28—he nonetheless 
worked hard to provide a strong judicial voice for his liberal views, 
particularly in First Amendment cases.  Most of these views were 
contained in concurrences and dissents, sometimes joined by others and 
sometimes solitary, that staked out independent and even controversial 
positions on important constitutional issues.   
The diverse strains at work in Rutledge—his personal warmth, his 
concern for the needs and the rights of individuals, his punishing 
commitment to the duties of an uncongenial job, and his sometimes bold 
assertions of an independent jurisprudence—suggest a complicated 
                                                                                                                          
24 Id. at 347.  According to Frank, Rutledge was “keenly aware” of his slow pace: “‘I’m just not 
as fast as Black or Douglas,’ he used to say with affectionate envy.”  Frank, supra note 19, at 277. 
25 FOWLER V. HARPER, JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND THE BRIGHT CONSTELLATION 24 (1965). 
26 Pollak, supra note 11, at 191–92.  Frank too noted Rutledge’s “one true serious limitation, 
prolixity.  Rutledge could not dispose of a point briefly; it was an emotional and mental impossibility.”  
Frank, supra note 19, at 277.   
27 According to his friend, the writer Irving Brant, Rutledge’s “nature compelled him to give more 
of himself in mind and spirit than the body could continue to replace.”  Irving Brant, Mr. Justice 
Rutledge—The Man, 25 IND. L.J. 424, 425 (1950).  Brant concludes that Rutledge’s “family and Court 
associates realized that he was driving himself beyond his powers and begged him to drop the 
nonmandatory work.  But the mandate was within himself.  He could not give less than all, so [he] gave 
his life.”  Id. at 443.  More specifically, two of his former law clerks report that, when preparing for the 
Court’s conference, “[i]t was his custom—until forbidden to do so by his doctor—to sit with his law 
clerk, into the following morning if necessary, and go over in detail the cases to be decided and the 
petitions for certiorari.”  Victor Brudney & Richard F. Wolfson, Mr. Justice Rutledge—Law Clerks’ 
Reflections, 25 IND. L.J. 455, 456 (1950).  
28 According to Brudney and Wolfson, Rutledge was a sociable man who suffered from “that 
isolation which membership on the Court tends to impose upon Justices.”  Brudney & Wolfson, supra 
note 27, at 458.  They describe him as “[f]ully cognizant of his isolation, indeed occasionally 
expressing a desire to return to academic life.”  Id. at 460. 
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relationship to his work on the Court.  It is intriguing to consider how such 
a Justice’s performance of his judicial role might have influenced a law 
clerk who observed Rutledge at close range for a year and found himself, a 
generation later, facing the same professional challenges. 
B.  The Opinions: Law and Consequences 
Although none of the opinions on which Rutledge’s legal reputation 
largely rests was written during the 1947 Term of Stevens’s clerkship, 
Stevens would certainly have been aware of them as expressions of his 
Justice’s foundational jurisprudence, both when they were written and in 
later years, despite Rutledge’s low public profile.  Stevens was a law 
student at Northwestern University from 1945 to 1947 and the co-editor-in-
chief of its Law Review in his final year, a period during which several of 
those opinions appeared and during which he might be expected to be 
particularly attuned to the work of the Court.29  Further, as Louis Pollak 
has argued, “the full force” of some of Rutledge’s positions, particularly 
those on First Amendment issues, “was not recognized until years after his 
death.”30  Justice Douglas, for example, noted his reliance on “the durable 
First Amendment philosophy” of Rutledge’s dissent in Everson v. Board of 
Education when, in 1962, Douglas joined the majority in Engel v. Vitale, 
the controversial case striking down the New York Regents’ school prayer 
as unconstitutional.31  
By the time Stevens joined the Supreme Court in 1975, Rutledge’s 
academic reputation was not strong; there is very little scholarship on his 
work to be found following a joint symposium in his honor published by 
the Iowa and Indiana law reviews shortly after his death in 1949.  The few 
exceptions tend to reflect personal connections between author and subject: 
a 1965 biography by Fowler Harper, a colleague of Rutledge’s at Iowa, and 
the essays, previously noted, by Stevens and Pollak.32  Stevens’s own essay 
is ample proof of his knowledge of and respect for the canon of Rutledge 
opinions. 
Those writing about Rutledge, including those who knew him 
personally, tend to sound two clear and related themes.  The first is that he 
                                                                                                                          
29 See John Paul Stevens, A Personal History of the Law Review, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 25, 25–26 
(2006). 
30 Pollak, supra note 11, at 191. 
31 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443–44 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Everson v. Bd. 
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53–54 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).  Pollak also notes that, a year earlier, 
Justice Black had acknowledged that the force of Rutledge’s dissent in an exclusionary rule case had 
“become compelling” in the intervening years and thus helped to shape his decisive fifth vote applying 
the rule to state courts in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662 (1961) (Black, J., concurring).  For a 
complete account of this episode, see Pollak, supra note 11 at 197–200. 
32 See HARPER, supra note 25; Pollak, supra note 11; Stevens, supra note 12.  Pollak also wrote 
an earlier piece on Rutledge.  See Louis H. Pollak, W.B.R.: Some Reflections, 71 YALE L.J. 1451 
(1962).  
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thought about the law in terms of its effects on people, both the specific 
parties before the Court and the wider population.  The second theme is 
that Rutledge viewed his role as doing justice rather than following 
precedent; in Pollak’s words, he was quite simply “not doctrinaire,”33 
preferring results to doctrinal consistency.  The two themes are closely 
tied.  The dean who saw part of his job as finding ways to help his students 
became the Justice who saw his job as reaching the just outcome in the 
cases that came before him.  Irving Brant recounts Rutledge’s description 
of his jurisprudential attitude: 
Justice Rutledge did not even render lip service to that 
concept of the law (usually stated more alluringly) which 
treats it as an absolute, to be applied in every case without 
regard to consequences, even though it means cutting a baby 
in two.  A large element in his method, he said, was to 
determine where justice lay and then look for valid principles 
of law to sustain it.  If judge-made law sustained injustice he 
would search for ways to change it.34 
Rutledge was not uneasy about a legal methodology unmoored from the 
constraints of doctrine and precedent.  In the introduction to his series of 
lectures on the Commerce Clause, A Declaration of Legal Faith, Rutledge 
sketched in broad terms his approach to the philosophical questions 
underlying the law and legal institutions: 
It is a matter of faith.  And faith is more felt than thought.  
From a universe compounded of order and chance, of fate 
and free will, of past and future, of good and evil, of all the 
irreconcilables going to make up the vast interacting stuff of 
life, each for himself must select what is valid and true to live 
by and die by.  However guided by reason, the choice at the 
last must be intuitive, must be felt, or it cannot be complete.  
So also must nations and societies choose and live by a faith.  
Else they die.35 
In one of his First Amendment opinions, Rutledge made a similar point 
about the complementary roles of intuition and reason in legal 
decisionmaking: 
Heart and mind are not identical.  Intuitive faith and reasoned 
judgment are not the same.  Spirit is not always thought.  But 
in the everyday business of living, secular or otherwise, these 
variant aspects of personality find inseparable expression in a 
                                                                                                                          
33 Pollak, supra note 11, at 202. 
34 Brant, supra note 27, at 439. 
35 WILEY RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 4–5 (1947).   
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thousand ways.  They cannot be altogether parted in law 
more than in life.36 
As a template for a future Justice, Rutledge’s approach, so exhausting in 
practice for himself, was also potentially liberating in its pragmatic pursuit 
of fairness and its resistance to the claims of reasoned consensus.  If each 
decisionmaker was entitled to pursue an individual sense of fairness, then a 
Justice was under no institutional constraint to reach accommodation with 
the views of colleagues.  At the same time, Rutledge felt an obligation to 
root his decisions in the particular context of each case, scrutinizing both 
record and briefs and then taking care to signal counsel in his opinion that 
he had done his homework.  The result of these diverse strains was often a 
long opinion that contained both highly abstract formulations and carefully 
documented factual details. 
Two of Rutledge’s best known First Amendment opinions, one for the 
Court and the other in dissent, illustrate the internal tensions of his 
methodology.  Thomas v. Collins, decided in 1945, rejected the application 
of a Texas statute requiring anyone soliciting new members for a labor 
union to first secure an organizer’s card from the state.37  The appellant, a 
vice president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, had been held in 
contempt for violating a temporary restraining order that prohibited him 
from addressing a mass meeting sponsored by a local union without first 
obtaining such a card; at the meeting Thomas spoke generally of the 
advantages of union membership and then invited one nonunion attendee 
to join.38  Writing for the Court, Rutledge held that the statute as applied to 
Thomas violated First Amendment rights of speech and assembly.39  
Rutledge’s chief argument focused on the problem of distinguishing 
Thomas’s general statements, which Texas conceded were protected 
speech, from his specific invitation.  This distinction, Rutledge found, was 
“the nub of the case”40 because it imposed an untenable burden on the 
speaker: “Such a distinction offers no security for free discussion.  In these 
conditions it blankets with uncertainty whatever may be said.  It compels 
the speaker to hedge and trim.”41  In the language of later Warren Court 
opinions, the requirement has a potentially chilling effect on speakers, 
deterring them from fully exercising their free speech rights (a point not 
strictly applicable to Thomas, who was in fact undeterred and suffered the 
consequences).42 
                                                                                                                          
36 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944). 
37 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945). 
38 Id. at 522–23. 
39 Id. at 534–35. 
40 Id. at 535. 
41 Id. 
42 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (“The chilling effect upon the 
exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the 
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This First Amendment insight is embedded in an opinion that covers 
twenty-six pages and contains twenty-four footnotes.  Rutledge is at pains 
to set forth all of the arguments raised by counsel before observing that 
“we put aside the broader contentions both parties have made and confine 
our decision to the narrow question whether the application made of § 5 in 
this case contravenes the First Amendment.”43  His final and longest 
footnote, which covers two half-pages in U.S. Reports, describes in detail 
the procedures established by the Texas Secretary of State for 
implementation of Section 5, the number of applications filed under those 
procedures, and their resolution.44  The opinion is, as Pollak notes, “too 
long and discursive for maximum impact.”45  At the same time, it also 
contains powerful language that frames the central issue at its most abstract 
and significant level: 
The case confronts us again with the duty our system 
places on this Court to say where the individual’s freedom 
ends and the State’s power begins.  Choice on that border, 
now as always delicate, is perhaps more so where the usual 
presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the 
preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the 
indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First 
Amendment.  That priority gives these liberties a sanctity and 
a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.46 
In two sentences, the previously diffuse opinion pinpoints two issues of 
grave constitutional import: the scope of the Court’s power to review 
legislative statutes touching on constitutional rights, and the question of 
whether First Amendment protections occupy a preferred position among 
the individual rights safeguarded by the Constitution.  Rutledge’s 
“perhaps” is neutralized by the third sentence’s direct statement, which 
asserts without qualification that the “priority” of the First Amendment 
assigns the Court an enhanced role to play in preventing “dubious 
intrusions” of speech rights.  Thomas thus combines both aspects of 
Rutledge’s style: the rival tendencies to base his opinions on constitutional 
intuitions and to provide copious factual detail.  It is hard not to wish that 
the opinion had been edited to limit the latter and elaborate the former. 
Rutledge’s dissent in Everson v. Board of Education displays a variant 
of the tension between broad constitutional principle and abundant 
supporting detail.  The Court’s opinion, written by Justice Black, upheld a 
New Jersey statute authorizing public payment for transportation of 
                                                                                                                          
prospects of its success or failure.”) (citations omitted). 
43 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 532–33 (1945). 
44 Id. at 541–42 n.24. 
45 Pollak, supra note 11, at 192. 
46 Thomas, 323 U.S. at 529–30 (citations omitted). 
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children to Catholic schools.47  Although Black, following Thomas 
Jefferson, reads the Establishment Clause “to erect ‘a wall of separation 
between Church and State’”48 that “must be kept high and impregnable,” 
he finds that the state’s program facilitating an educational goal has not 
“breached” that wall.49  
In his dissent, Rutledge also embraces the wall of separation but insists 
that the majority has itself created a breach by upholding the statute.  
Rutledge opens his opinion with an extended quotation from Jefferson’s 
“Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,” which asserted that 
“compel[ling] a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation 
of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.”50  The quotation 
is followed immediately by Rutledge’s own gloss on author and bill: “I 
cannot believe that the great author of those words, or the men who made 
them law, could have joined in this decision.”51  What comes next, in a 
thirty-five page opinion with sixty-one footnotes, is an account of the 
passage of Jefferson’s Bill, including the role played by James Madison’s 
celebrated Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 
(which is also included as an appendix) and of the direct link between the 
Virginia documents and the First Amendment.52  At the conclusion of his 
opinion, Rutledge draws back from the details of history and statute to 
frame the issue, as he did in Thomas, at a high level of abstraction; the case 
is no longer merely about educational funding policies but instead, drawing 
on his own earlier opinion, about “the preferred place given in our scheme 
to the great democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment”;53 
Two great drives are constantly in motion to abridge, in 
the name of education, the complete division of religion and 
civil authority which our forefathers made.  One is to 
introduce religious education and observances into the public 
schools.  The other, to obtain public funds for the aid and 
support of various private religious schools . . . .  In my 
opinion both avenues were closed by the Constitution.  
Neither should be opened by this Court.  The matter is not 
one of quantity, to be measured by the amount of money 
expended.  Now as in Madison’s day it is one of principle, to 
                                                                                                                          
47 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
48 Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). 
49 Id. at 18. 
50 Id. at 28 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
51 Id. at 29. 
52 Id. at 63.  According to Rutledge, “[a]ll the great instruments of the Virginia struggle for 
religious liberty thus became warp and woof of our constitutional tradition, not simply by the course of 
history, but by the common unifying force of Madison’s life, thought, and sponsorship.”  Id. at 39.  The 
two appendices to the dissent cover an additional eleven pages.  Id. at 63–74. 
53 Id. at 62 n.61. 
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keep separate the separate spheres as the First Amendment 
drew them; to prevent the first experiment upon our liberties; 
and to keep the question from becoming entangled in 
corrosive precedents.  We should not be less strict to keep 
strong and untarnished the one side of the shield of religious 
freedom than we have been of the other.54 
Yet even in his soaring conclusion, Rutledge cannot entirely escape from 
his rival impulse to document—the ellipsis in this passage contains 
citations to two books and a student law review note.55 This anticlimactic 
reference, like the enforcement details in the final footnote of Thomas, 
serves only to undermine the rhetorical force of his First Amendment 
vision. 
In light of opinions like Everson, it is curious that in In re Yamashita56 
Rutledge begins his most celebrated dissent with a statement of serious 
reservations about disagreeing with the majority: 
Not with ease does one find his views at odds with the 
Court’s in a matter of this character and gravity.  Only the 
most deeply felt convictions could force one to differ.  That 
reason alone leads me to do so now, against strong 
considerations for withholding dissent.57 
As evidenced by his opinion-writing record, Rutledge was not usually 
reluctant to write separately.  Of his 169 Supreme Court opinions, sixty-
five were written for the Court, sixty-one were dissents, and forty-three 
were concurrences.58  He wrote to friends that he considered dissents 
“more fun” than majority opinions because “one is more free to say what 
he wants to say” and “more valuable” than unanimity in analyzing 
“fundamental problems of social policy” that benefit from multiple 
perspectives.59  Yamashita, however, was an unusual case, a challenge to 
the military commission that convicted the Commanding General of the 
Japanese Army in the Philippines of violations of the law of war and 
sentenced him to death for numerous atrocities committed by Japanese 
soldiers under his command against civilians and prisoners of war.  Seven 
Justices upheld the conviction; Rutledge and Murphy filed separate 
dissents, based on Rutledge’s suggestion to his colleague that “‘You take 
                                                                                                                          
54 Id. at 63 (citations omitted).   
55 The citation, omitted supra note 54, reads: “See Johnson, The Legal Status of Church-State 
Relationships in the United States (1934); Thayer, Religion in Public Education (1947); Note (1941) 50 
Yale L.J. 917.”  Everson, 330 U.S. at 63. 
56 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).  
57 Id. at 41 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).  Justice Murphy joined in Rutledge’s dissent.  Id. at 81. 
58 FERREN, supra note 10, at 348. 
59 Id. at 196. 
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the charge, I’ll take the balance.’”60  Murphy joined Rutledge’s opinion, 
but Rutledge chose not to join Murphy’s. 
Like his opinions in Thomas and Everson, Rutledge’s Yamashita 
dissent is a blend of the abstract with the particular, covering forty pages 
with forty-two footnotes.  The basic theme is the unfairness of the 
procedures used to convict Yamashita, an unfairness by which Rutledge 
finds himself “forced to speak.”61  The passage setting out his thesis is 
among his most plainspokenly powerful: 
More is at stake than General Yamashita’s fate.  There 
could be no possible sympathy for him if he is guilty of the 
atrocities for which his death is sought.  But there can be and 
should be justice administered according to law.  In this stage 
of the war’s aftermath it is too early for Lincoln’s great spirit, 
best lighted in the Second Inaugural, to have wide hold for 
the treatment of foes.  It is not too early, it is never too early, 
for the nation steadfastly to follow its great constitutional 
traditions, none older or more universally protective against 
unbridled power than due process of law in the trial and 
punishment of men, that is, of all men, whether citizens, 
aliens, alien enemies or enemy belligerents.  It can become 
too late.62 
Rutledge recognizes that Yamashita’s trial is “unprecedented in our 
history”63 and that the Court finds itself on “strange ground,”64 but he is 
undeterred by the novelty of the legal landscape because “[p]recedent is 
not all-controlling in law.”65  Instead, he is prepared to find his way 
independently, guided by the judicial tradition of “the great landmarks left 
behind and the direction they point ahead.”66  Assessing the trial afforded 
Yamashita, Rutledge identifies several practices that violate the tradition: 
the commission was unconstitutionally constituted; no valid proof of the 
petitioner’s knowledge of the crimes was presented; basic evidentiary rules 
were violated; the petitioner’s counsel were given inadequate time to 
prepare his defense; and both the Articles of War and the Geneva 
Convention were held inapplicable to the proceedings.67  Rutledge 
characteristically explores these issues in some detail, lamenting that “only 
a short sketch can be given concerning each matter.”68    
                                                                                                                          
60 Id. at 303. 
61 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 42 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
62 Id. at 41–42. 
63 Id. at 42. 
64 Id. at 43. 
65 Id.  
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 43–45. 
68 Id. at 47. 
 226 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:211 
The final section of the opinion, though brief, is the most sharply 
focused in its insistence that the Court has, sub silencio, denied Yamashita 
the protections of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.  “And this,” 
according to Rutledge, “is the great issue in the cause.”69  Relying on 
intuition rather than precedent or history, he stakes out his own 
counterposition in broad terms: 
I cannot accept the view that anywhere in our system 
resides or lurks a power so unrestrained to deal with any 
human being through any process of trial.  What military 
agencies or authorities may do with our enemies in battle or 
invasion, apart from proceedings in the nature of trial and 
some semblance of judicial action, is beside the point.  Nor 
has any human being heretofore been held to be wholly 
beyond elementary procedural protection by the Fifth 
Amendment.  I cannot consent to even implied departure 
from that great absolute.70 
Rutledge’s dissent applies the intuition he celebrated in A Declaration of 
Legal Faith to constitutional text.  He is asserting a new principle of law—
that our constitutional tradition requires the application of Fifth 
Amendment protections even to an accused war criminal—with confidence 
that, “since every precedent has an origin,” he is justified in originating his 
expansive vision of the scope of due process.71 
Read together, these three opinions—Thomas, Everson and 
Yamashita—suggest that Rutledge was an inevitable supporter of 
individual rights over the claims of government.  Yet, in an essay written 
before his own appointment to the federal bench, Justice Stevens pointed 
out that “[n]either at the beginning nor the end of his judicial career did 
Justice Rutledge automatically champion a claimed individual liberty.”72  
While Rutledge insisted on the right of even an enemy general to due 
process protections, he also joined the majority in both Hirabayashi v. 
United States and Korematsu v. United States,73 cases upholding, 
respectively, the curfew for and internment of Japanese-Americans under 
military orders.74  In Hirabayashi, decided four months after he joined the 
Court, Rutledge added a brief concurrence cautiously distancing himself 
from “the suggestion, if that is intended,” that the courts lacked power to 
                                                                                                                          
69 Id. at 79. 
70 Id. at 81. 
71 Id. at 43.  Ferren distinguishes the methodology of Rutledge’s dissent from Murphy’s, calling 
the latter “a sermon based on natural law, not just on the Constitution.”  FERREN, supra note 10, at 303. 
72 Stevens, supra note 12, at 178. 
73 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944). 
74 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219. 
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review such military orders.75  Acknowledging the “wide discretion” 
available to a military officer, Rutledge observed that “it does not follow 
there may not be bounds beyond which he cannot go and, if he oversteps 
them, that the courts may not have power to protect the civilian citizen,” 
although he found that “in this case that question need not be faced.”76  As 
the junior Justice in Korematsu, he provided the tie-breaking ninth vote in 
support of internment, apparently feeling bound by his earlier vote in 
Hirabayashi.77  Although Rutledge lived for almost five years after 
Korematsu, his biographer has found no evidence that he ever expressed 
regret for his vote in either of these cases.78 
There is another striking instance in which Rutledge found a 
countervailing value that led him to reject a claim of individual rights, this 
time under the First Amendment.  Writing for a five Justice majority in 
Prince v. Massachusetts, he rejected the challenge by a Jehovah’s Witness 
to her conviction for violating a state child labor statute by allowing her 
niece to sell religious magazines on the street as required by their 
religion.79  Rutledge found two rights at issue: the parent’s or guardian’s 
right “to bring up the child in the way he should go, which for appellant 
means to teach him the tenets and the practices of their faith,” and the 
child’s right to follow her faith by distributing the magazines as a method 
of preaching the gospel.80  The countervailing value Rutledge identified 
was the state police power to protect children, an issue of particular 
concern to him since his defense of the proposed constitutional amendment 
to regulate child labor.  Despite the “preferred position”81 of the religious 
right invoked by the appellant, Rutledge held that the state’s right to 
safeguard the child prevailed: “Parents may be free to become martyrs 
themselves.  But it does not follow they are free, in identical 
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children . . . .”82  He cites no 
authority for that proposition; it is presumably supported by his intuition 
that the claimed right might “create situations difficult enough for adults to 
cope with and wholly inappropriate for children, especially of tender years, 
                                                                                                                          
75 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 114 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
76 Id. 
77 See FERREN, supra note 10, at 249.  Rutledge’s comments at conference suggest that his sense 
of military necessity overcame his reservations about both cases: 
Announced Rutledge: “I had to swallow Hirabayashi.  I didn’t like it.  At that time I 
knew if I went along with that order I had to go along with detention for [a] 
reasonably necessary time.  Nothing but necessity would justify it.”  Because of 
Hirabayashi, he concluded, “I vote to affirm.” 
Id. (footnote omitted).  
78 Id. at 258.  Ferren offers a sympathetic rationale for Rutledge’s position.  See id. at 255–59. 
79 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159, 170 (1944). 
80 Id. at 164. 
81 Id. (citations omitted). 
82 Id. at 170. 
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to face.”83 
This broad proposition, however loosely supported, is related to a more 
pragmatic strain in Rutledge’s jurisprudence: his concern with the practical 
consequences of Court decisions not only on the litigants but also on the 
wider population.  It may appear, as it did in Knauer v. United States, as 
the basis for protecting a highly unsympathetic defendant, a German 
immigrant who continued to support Hitler’s regime and policies after 
becoming a naturalized American citizen.84  The Court upheld the 
revocation of his citizenship on the ground that Knauer had committed 
fraud in swearing his oath of allegiance to the United States.  Writing for 
himself and Justice Murphy, Rutledge announced at the outset that “[m]y 
concern is not for Paul Knauer,” whom he dismissed as “a thorough-going 
Nazi addicted to philosophies altogether hostile to the democratic 
framework in which we believe and live.”85  His concern was rather for the 
consequences of a holding that distinguished naturalized from native-born 
citizens and thus created a vulnerable class: “[I]f one man’s citizenship can 
thus be taken away, so can that of any other.”86  He had made the same 
argument seven months earlier, in a case overturning the revocation of 
citizenship of a member of the Communist Party, when he concurred to 
emphasize his concern over a decision that “[a]ctually, though indirectly, . 
. . affects millions” by creating a category of “citizenship in attenuated, if 
not suspended, animation.”87  Just as his concern was practical, so was 
Rutledge’s solution—to employ “other effective methods for dealing with 
those who are disloyal, just as there are for such citizens at birth.”88 
Although most of Rutledge’s best known opinions urge vigorous 
protection of individual rights, one—Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of 
Los Angeles89—is cited for a doctrine that seems an unlikely perspective 
for its author to advance.  The case sets forth the arguments for what 
Rutledge calls the Court’s “policy of strict necessity in disposing of 
constitutional issues,”90 its reluctance to exercise the power of judicial 
review over cases otherwise within its jurisdiction that challenge the 
constitutionality of government action.  He catalogues the advantages of 
that reluctance: 
possible consequences for others stemming also from 
constitutional roots; the comparative finality of those 
consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other 
                                                                                                                          
83 Id. at 169–70. 
84 Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 675 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 676. 
87 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 165–66 (1943) (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
88 Knauer, 328 U.S. at 679. 
89 Rescue Army v. Mun. Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 550 (1947). 
90 Id. at 568. 
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repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of 
their authority; the necessity, if government is to function 
constitutionally, for each to keep within its power, including 
the courts; the inherent limitations of the judicial process, 
arising especially from its largely negative character and 
limited resources of enforcement; withal in the paramount 
importance of constitutional adjudication in our system.91 
This policy of restraint, he argues, has worked well “for the preservation of 
individual rights” in the past, even though it is difficult to administer: “It is 
largely a question of enough or not enough, the sort of thing precisionists 
abhor but constitutional adjudication nevertheless constantly requires.”92 
As a judicial role model, then, Rutledge offered an assortment of 
qualities for both emulation and skepticism.  If his strong commitment to 
individual rights and his starkly simple vision of constitutional fairness 
offered an appealing conception of a Justice’s role, his methodology raised 
some concerns; Rutledge’s thoroughness tended to blunt the force of his 
opinions; his preference for a just result over precedent often left him 
writing separately; his work habits may have denied him the chance to 
write for the Court or for a unified dissent on issues of great import.  For a 
recent law school graduate with a year to observe the role his Justice 
played in the Court’s decisionmaking dynamic, a Rutledge clerkship may 
have provided Stevens equal guidance on what to do and what not to do as 
a Supreme Court Justice. 
C.  The Clerk and the Justice: Stevens on Rutledge 
It was literally a matter of luck that John Paul Stevens became law 
clerk to Justice Rutledge for the Court’s 1947 Term.  In 1945 Stevens, 
discharged from his military service, enrolled in a program at 
Northwestern University School of Law that allowed veterans to complete 
the three-year curriculum in two years.  During their second year, Stevens 
and Art Seider, co-editors-in-chief of the Northwestern Law Review, were 
offered clerkships with Rutledge and Chief Justice Vinson.  The question 
was which editor would fill which clerkship.  Stevens recently described 
the episode and its resolution for a special issue of the Law Review:93 
Willard Wirtz, then a professor of law at Northwestern, was a 
close friend of Justice Wiley Rutledge, and Willard Pedrick, 
also a law professor at Northwestern, had a close relationship 
                                                                                                                          
91 Id. at 571. 
92 Id. at 574. 
93 Stevens, supra note 29, at 25.  The fact that the issue is a symposium devoted to the Law 
Review—The First Century: Celebrating 100 Years of Legal Scholarship—may explain the limited 
scope of Stevens’s memories.     
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with Chief Justice Fred Vinson and had persuaded him to hire 
Frank Allen as a clerk for the 1947 Term.  Unbeknownst to 
Art and me, the two Willards had had discussions with the 
two Justices and believed that two clerkships would be 
available to us: one with Rutledge during the 1947 Term and 
the other with the Chief Justice during the 1948 Term.  
Considering us equally qualified for both positions, they 
came to the Law Review office to find out which position 
each of us would prefer.  While more prestige would attach to 
a clerkship for the Chief Justice, given our advanced age, we 
both wanted the earlier opportunity.  To resolve the conflict, 
we resorted to a tie-breaking method, one that I have often 
been tempted to use during my years on the bench: We 
flipped a coin.  Needless to say, I won the toss and have had 
nothing but fond memories of the Law Review and of my 
good friend Art ever since.94 
In telling the story, Stevens is candid that the basis for his preference was 
timing rather than prestige.  He makes no mention of the significant 
jurisprudential differences between Rutledge and Vinson as a factor in his 
preference, and looking back on the coin toss Stevens makes no claim that 
the outcome paired him with the Justice whose legal views were more in 
harmony with his own.  The fond memories invoked are limited to the Law 
Review and Art.   
More than forty years earlier, however, Stevens had made clear his 
admiration for both Rutledge’s jurisprudence and his approach to his 
judicial duties in what Alexander Bickel called “a most artistic, 
affectionate, but withal not uncritical sketch.”95  Stevens, then a partner in 
a Chicago law firm who had taught as an adjunct at the University of 
Chicago and Northwestern law schools, was invited to contribute a lecture 
on Rutledge that was subsequently published in a collection of essays on a 
handful of important Supreme Court Justices.96  Although Stevens does not 
discuss his own clerkship experience in his piece, he does identify 
Rutledge as “primarily . . . a teacher,”97 a role that suggests the potential 
mentoring relationship of Justice and clerk.  Like his fellow clerk Louis 
Pollak and others, Stevens concedes the perceived weaknesses of 
Rutledge’s opinion-writing: his long, sometimes repetitive opinions and 
the time he spent in drafting them.98  Stevens makes clear, however, that 
                                                                                                                          
94 Id. at 26 (footnotes omitted). 
95 Alexander M. Bickel, Book Review, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1126, 1129 (1957). 
96 Stevens, supra note 12, at 177, 200.  The other Justices included were Holmes, John Marshall, 
Stone, Bradley, Brandeis, Sutherland, Hughes, and Taney.  Id. at ix. 
97 Id. at 178. 
98 See id. at 182, 193–94 (giving an explanation for the length of Rutledge’s opinions).  Stevens 
notes, “Justice Rutledge frequently wrote long opinions, and sometimes his style seems redundant.  He 
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these supposed faults are actually the consequences of distinct virtues.  
Thus, “the length was primarily a matter of finding it necessary to say a 
great deal in order to explain fully the reasons for his decision,”99 and the 
time spent preparing an opinion reflected the care taken in decisionmaking: 
Many judges find it easy to arrive at a decision but have 
great difficulty in preparing an opinion.  For Justice 
Rutledge, the converse was true.  He was slow in making 
decisions.  His capacity to see the merit in both sides of a 
controversy prevented him from forming a judgment 
hastily—unless of course the issue had arisen before.  
Typically, however, he “mulled over” problems, to use his 
own phrase.  He frequently advised others to take their time 
in making important personal decisions.  When he was 
convinced, however—and there were times when lingering 
doubts remained even after an opinion was handed down—he 
usually found the preparation of an opinion easy.  The work 
was time-consuming and exacting—for the most part he 
prepared drafts in his own hand—but not as difficult as the 
process of decision.100 
Stevens insists that “[a]lthough long, Rutledge’s opinions are easily read 
and understood” and that “his style was deliberately chosen to give full 
expression to his precise meaning, for he could express himself in terse and 
amiable fashion when he chose.”101  More fundamentally, he admires 
Rutledge’s “ability to see a problem from its various approaches,”102 a 
quality related to his tendency to consider the range of practical solutions 
to a legal problem.  What others have viewed as stylistic weaknesses are, 
for Stevens, the hallmark of a thorough and pragmatic legal mind.  “To 
me,” he concludes, “Rutledge’s long opinions are evidence of two virtues 
of a great judge—tolerance and judgment.”103 
It is noteworthy, in light of his own substantial record of concurrences 
and dissents, that Stevens views Rutledge’s use of separate opinions as 
“reflect[ing] a quality of integrity that is difficult to describe.”104  When 
Rutledge wrote separately to clarify his position, even though he had also 
joined the majority, “[h]is conscience literally forced him to add the 
                                                                                                                          
habitually used a pair of words where one would have served almost as well.”  Id. at 181. 
99 Id. at 182. 
100 Id. at 193–94.  Stevens further argues that “[t]he former dean’s scholarship also contributed to 
the length of his opinions.”  Id. at 182. 
101 Id. at 181.  Stevens provides an example of the pithier mode: “But this case boils down to an 
old adage about sauce and geese, which need not be given citation.”  Id.  
102 Id. at 185. 
103 Id. at 182. 
104 Id. at 193.  
 232 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:211 
statement of the real basis for his vote.”105  On this point, Stevens offers, 
somewhat obliquely, his own observations of what he terms Rutledge’s 
“amazing conscience.”106  He cites Rutledge’s “refusal to accept free books 
from law publishers,” a seemingly “trivial” position “when described to 
others because no words can adequately picture the sincerity of purpose 
which motivated the Justice.”107  More dramatically, Rutledge reluctantly 
recused himself from Shelley v. Kraemer,108 the historic restrictive 
covenant case decided in the spring of Stevens’s clerkship year, “for a 
reason which was certainly trivial if measured by its capacity, or even its 
tendency, to influence his vote,”109 the fact that the deed to his own home 
contained such covenants.  According to Ferren, Rutledge wanted to sit, 
even “sending his clerks to the Recorder of Deeds office in search of a 
property law basis for finding his own covenants unenforceable,” because 
he felt strongly about the case and worried, unnecessarily as it turned out, 
that his vote might be needed to reach the right result.110 
Stevens admires another quality in Rutledge that others have noted in 
Stevens’s own career on the bench.  Although Rutledge believed that “the 
securing and maintaining of individual freedom is the main end of 
society,”111 he was never a completely predictable judge.  Stevens 
announces early in the essay that “[n]either at the beginning nor at the end 
of his judicial career did Justice Rutledge automatically champion a 
claimed individual liberty.  In civil liberties cases, as in others, his 
judgments were predicated on a painstaking review of every aspect of the 
litigation which came before him for decision.”112  As evidence, he points 
to the first and last cases Rutledge decided, one a professor’s claim of 
retaliatory termination for his testimony to a congressional committee and 
the other a criminal defendant’s challenge to a warrantless search of his 
car, both of which the Justice decided against the claimant.113  Stevens 
suggests that what he calls Rutledge’s “concern with the integrity of the 
                                                                                                                          
105 Id.  
106 Id.  A former Stevens clerk, Christopher Eisgruber, has recently offered his own example of 
Stevens’s judicial conscience.  When his law clerks urged Stevens to lobby Justice O’Connor for her 
vote on an abortion case, Stevens demurred: “The opinion, he told us, ought to stand or fall on the force 
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feel pressured by the conversation.”  CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 59 (2007).  
107 Stevens, supra note 12, at 193.  
108 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
109 Stevens, supra note 12, at 193.  The case was decided on May 3, 1948, with Justices Reed and 
Jackson also not participating.  Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23. 
110 FERREN, supra note 10, at 387.  Reed and Jackson also had restrictive covenants in their deeds.  
Id.  
111 Stevens, supra note 12, at 191. 
112 Id. at 178–79.  
113 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177–78 (1949); Cobb v. Howard Univ., 106 F.2d 
860, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1939). 
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judicial process”114 was a primary source of his independence, making it 
possible for him to both reject sympathetic petitioners and support highly 
unpopular claims based on his reading of the record and his commitment to 
fairness.  Stevens writes at some length about Rutledge’s Yamashita 
dissent, the most celebrated example of that independence, but opens the 
essay with a lesser known case, Ahrens v. Clark,115 which he views as also 
illustrative of Rutledge’s jurisprudence.   
What Stevens does not mention is that he prepared a draft of Ahrens 
that Rutledge drew on heavily in his opinion, and—as Joseph T. Thai has 
demonstrated in his fascinating essay—the case represents a dramatic 
intersection of Justice and clerk.116  The omission is not surprising.  In his 
many talks and occasional writings, Stevens seldom mentions Rutledge or 
refers to his clerkship.  He has praised Ferren’s biography as “a superb 
piece of work that anyone interested in the history of our Court will enjoy 
immensely,” though not as a long overdue study of a personally admired 
Justice.117  His few references to his clerkship tend to provide a source of 
praise for his colleagues on the Court.  Thus, Stevens recalls reading 
memos on in forma pauperis cases written by Justice White during his own 
clerkship with Chief Justice Vinson, “having been cautioned by my boss, 
Justice Rutledge, to examine them with particular care because he felt that 
the Vinson Chambers might overlook a meritorious claim.  I don’t 
remember any flaws in the memos that were signed ‘BRW.’”118  And he 
notes that “[m]y favorable impression of Thurgood Marshall was first 
formed when, as a law clerk, I watched him argue in the Supreme Court . . 
. .”119 
Despite this scarcity of direct commentary by Stevens on his clerkship, 
there is evidence that links his year with Rutledge to Stevens’s later 
jurisprudence on issues of individual rights and due process protections.  
Diane Amann, a former Stevens clerk, has identified two cases from that 
term, in addition to Ahrens, which reveal Stevens in harmony with 
Rutledge.120  In the file for a case challenging, on equal protection grounds, 
Oklahoma’s refusal to admit a black student to its law school, Amann has 
found a memo to Rutledge in which Stevens “advised taking judicial notice 
that ‘the doctrine of segregation is itself a violation of the Constitutional 
                                                                                                                          
114 Stevens, supra note 12, at 198. 
115 Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948). 
116 See Joseph T. Thai, The Law Clerk Who Wrote Rasul v. Bush: John Paul Stevens’s Influence 
from World War II to the War on Terror, 92 VA. L. REV. 501, 507 (2006).  See also infra notes 175–
206 and accompanying text (discussing the writing of Rutledge’s opinion in Ahrens v. Clark). 
117 John Paul Stevens, What I Did This Summer, CBA RECORD, Oct. 2004, at 34 (2004). 
118 Justice John Paul Stevens, Random Recollections, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269, 277 (2005). 
119 Justice John Paul Stevens, Opening Assembly Address, American Bar Association Annual 
Meeting, Orlando, Florida, August 3, 1996, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 21, 29 (1996). 
120 See Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens, Human Rights Judge, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1569, 1589–92 (2006). 
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requirement’ and concluded that ‘if there is any chance of granting any 
relief, I would do so.’”121  In the second case, one seeking post-conviction 
relief based on the Byzantine nature of Illinois state court procedures, 
Rutledge incorporated language from another Stevens memorandum into 
his concurrence, including Stevens’s tart observation “that the Illinois 
procedural labyrinth is made up entirely of blind alleys, each of which is 
useful only as a means of convincing the federal courts that the state road 
which the petitioner has taken was the wrong one.”122  In chambers where 
the law clerk was strongly encouraged to voice any disagreement with his 
Justice, such memos suggest that Stevens and Rutledge occupied common 
ground on these issues.  Even more persuasively, in a recent interview 
Stevens made explicit Rutledge’s influence on his executive power 
jurisprudence.  Working with Rutledge on post-war security cases, Stevens 
said, “shaped his views about the importance of judicial oversight of the 
president’s aggressive actions in terrorism cases after 9/11.”123  Such 
evidence supports Norman Dorsen’s observation that Stevens’s contextual 
approach to decisionmaking, his courage, and “his commitment to ‘fairness 
and justice’ make[] Stevens the intellectual heir of Justice Rutledge . . . 
.”124    
III.  JOHN PAUL STEVENS  
A.  The Man 
The arc of Stevens’s life story is markedly different from that of 
Rutledge.  While Rutledge was born to a clerical family of limited means 
in a small Kentucky town, Stevens was born into an affluent Chicago 
family in 1920.  His grandfather founded the Illinois Life Insurance Co., 
and his father and uncle built the luxurious Stevens Hotel, whose lobby 
featured bronze statues for which Stevens and his brothers served as 
models.125  In his comfortable boyhood, Stevens attended the University of 
Chicago laboratory school and encountered such notables as Amelia 
Earhart and Charles Lindbergh at the hotel.126  That pleasant life was 
                                                                                                                          
121 Id. at 1589.  The case was Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 
631 (1948).  Amann notes that “Rutledge filed a lone dissent from the denial of mandamus, though on a 
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122 Amann, supra note 120, at 1590 (quoting Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 567 (1947) 
(Rutledge, J., concurring)). 
123 Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 55, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
124 Norman Dorsen, John Paul Stevens, 1992/93 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. xxv, xxv–xxviii. 
125 Charles Lane, Finding Justice on a Small Scale; Recently Identified Archive Photo Captures a 
Young John Paul Stevens, WASH. POST, June 5, 2005, at D1, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
WPOST File.  
126 Id.  According to Amann, “Amelia Earhart scolded him for being out late on a school night, 
and Charles Lindbergh, just back from his landmark solo flight to Paris, gave the boy a dove.”  Amann, 
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disrupted first by his family’s financial problems following the 1929 crash 
and, more dramatically, by his father’s subsequent conviction for 
embezzlement, eventually overturned by the Illinois Supreme Court in 
1934.127  Reflecting on the episode more than seventy years later, Stevens 
described it as “[a] totally unjust conviction” from which he learned “that 
the criminal justice system can misfire sometimes,” a lesson reflected in 
his jurisprudence.128 
In contrast to Rutledge’s academic struggles, Stevens graduated Phi 
Beta Kappa from the University of Chicago in 1941 and then enlisted in 
the United States Navy shortly before Pearl Harbor.129  He served as a 
cryptographer in the Pacific, earning a bronze star and helping to break a 
code that contained information allowing United States pilots to shoot 
down the plane carrying Japanese Admiral Yamamoto.130  According to 
Stevens, this targeting of “a particular individual” disturbed him and has 
influenced his approach to the death penalty, which he has said should be 
used sparingly and administered with great care.131  After the war, Stevens 
enrolled at Northwestern University School of Law, where he served as co-
editor-in-chief of the Law Review and graduated with the highest grades on 
record before proceeding to the Court for his clerkship with Rutledge.132  
Following his clerkship, Stevens became an antitrust attorney in Chicago 
and taught as an adjunct faculty member at Chicago area law schools.133 
Stevens’s correspondence with Rutledge in the brief period between 
the end of his clerkship in 1948 and Rutledge’s death in 1949 indicates that 
Stevens had considered a teaching position at Yale Law School but 
decided that he preferred private practice to an academic career for several 
reasons.  In a letter written in early September 1948, following the 
clerkship, he told Rutledge that “[e]ven after all the thought I have given 
the problem, I find it somewhat difficult to articulate the reasons for my 
decision”134 but then went on to delineate the mix of predilection and 
pragmatism informing his choice: 
Perhaps the main reason is that I really think Iwill [sic] enjoy 
practice more than teaching.  As part of the same reason, I 
think that I need the practical experience to round out my 
                                                                                                                          
supra note 120, at 1580. 
127 Lane, supra note 125. 
128 Rosen, supra note 123, at 54–55. 
129 Richard Y. Funston, Stevens, John Paul, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME 
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130 Rosen, supra note 123, at 55. 
131 Id. (quoting Stevens). 
132 Funston, supra note 129, at 976. 
133 Id. 
134 Letter from John Paul Stevens to Wiley Rutledge (Sept. 4, 1948), available in Box 46, Wiley 
Rutledge Collection, Manuscript Reading Room, James Madison Memorial Building, Library of 
Congress, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Rutledge Papers Box 46]. 
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character.  Almost my entire life has been spent in academic 
circles, and even my navy work was of a peculiarly scholarly 
type.  I think also that while I will learn something from 
seeing the reactionaries’ side of things, that [sic] my 
philosophy is sufficiently developed so that I will not be 
converted from my present general point of view. Also, 
though I thinkyou [sic] would disagree on this point, I am 
inclined to feel that there is more chance of both practicing 
and teaching if I start with the practice.  In other words, I 
think it will be easier to move from practice into teaching 
than vice versa.135 
The letter shows Stevens weighing his intellectual interest in the law 
against the appeal of the more active engagement of private practice and 
opting for the latter, at least at first, as a way of completing his education 
without any risk of altering his personal philosophy or foreclosing a 
subsequent teaching career.  In its calm assessment and candid 
pragmatism, the letter foreshadows Stevens’s later approach to his judicial 
duties.  Though he remained in practice, Stevens taught as a lecturer at 
Northwestern University from 1950 to 1954 and at the University of 
Chicago from 1954 to 1958, proving his early prediction of combining two 
careers to be at least temporarily accurate.136  In a 1949 letter to Rutledge, 
Stevens’s further reflections on his future career also foreshadowed his 
independent nature; he reports that, although he “like[s] working for this 
firm as well as I would any other,” he hopes “to hang out a shingle with 
one or two other fellows of about my age,” a goal he met two years later.137  
Appointed by President Nixon to the Seventh Circuit in 1970, he served for 
five years before his nomination to the Supreme Court in 1975 by 
President Ford was confirmed unanimously by the Senate.138 
Despite their divergent backgrounds and educational experiences, 
Rutledge and Stevens do have in common several notable aspects of their 
professional lives.  Both were, in a sense, Midwesterners—one by 
adoption, the other by birth—who came to the Supreme Court after 
relatively brief stints on Courts of Appeals.  Both were drawn to a career as 
a legal academic, though Stevens resisted the pull, and both brought to the 
                                                                                                                          
135 Id.  
136 8 A Biographical Sketch of John Paul Stevens, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT 
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Court a hands-on approach to their judicial responsibilities.  Although the 
current volume of cert filings makes it impossible for any Justice to follow 
Rutledge’s commitment to examining all cert petitions personally, Stevens 
continues to insist that “[o]nly when a justice and his clerks individually 
review each of the petitions . . . can they ensure that the other justices 
aren’t overlooking important allegations of wrongdoing from marginalized 
applicants whose voices deserve to be heard.”139  And just as Rutledge 
regarded it as his duty to acknowledge in his opinions all of counsel’s 
arguments, so Stevens defends his practice of frequent dissents and 
concurrences in part because he “think[s] the litigants are entitled to know 
how the judges appraised the arguments and to be sure that all of them 
understood the arguments that were presented”140 and, even more 
precisely, that those arguments “were persuasive to some even though not 
to all.”141   
Although it is difficult to gauge with precision the extent to which 
Stevens’s approach to his Court duties has been influenced by his year with 
Rutledge, there is one aspect of Stevens’s Court life that does seem to 
reflect directly his own clerkship experience: the relationship of Justice and 
clerk. 
B.  In Chambers: The Clerkship 
As one of the five clerks turned Justices, Stevens has had the relatively 
rare opportunity of playing both roles, and it appears that he has in some 
respects chosen to recreate the roles that he and Rutledge played in the 
1947 Term.  Two recent books on Supreme Court law clerks provide some 
inside information, most from interviews with former clerks, on the ways 
in which Rutledge and Stevens have used their clerks.  That information, 
more abundant for the Stevens than the Rutledge clerks, nonetheless 
indicates that Stevens has chosen to follow some of his Justice’s practices.  
Todd Peppers has described Stevens as “the only sitting Supreme Court 
justice who has not fully adopted the rules and norms of the modern 
clerkship model” but has instead chosen to follow “the prevailing Court 
norms of the 1940s” that shaped his own clerkship,142 even preferring to 
hire fewer clerks than the number authorized by Congress.143  Under those 
earlier norms, as described by former Rutledge clerks Victor Brudney and 
Richard F. Wolfson, Rutledge formed “an intimate association” with his 
                                                                                                                          
139 Rosen, supra note 123, at 72 (paraphrasing Stevens). 
140 HEARINGS, supra note 136, at 69. 
141 Id. at 41.  
142 PEPPERS, supra note 3, at 195. 
143 See LAZARUS, supra note 1, at 19 (“Currently, every Justice is entitled to four clerks, though 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice John Paul Stevens employ only three.”). 
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law clerks in which “the clerk was constantly made to feel equal.”144  That 
equality included the license to discuss cases freely, a practice Rutledge 
strongly encouraged:  
He wanted to know the ideas of a different generation, and he 
wanted someone around him who would feel free to offer 
these ideas.  To this end he encouraged his law clerk to put 
forward his own notions and prodded him to defend them.  A 
visitor sitting outside the Justice’s office might be surprised 
to hear strong words within, both in the Justice’s familiar 
drawl and in a younger voice.  For if his law clerk took the 
hint and pressed hard, the Justice felt free to retort in kind.145 
When the Court was considering Hirabayashi, Brudney apparently took 
the license too far, suggesting that Rutledge look at an FBI report 
expressing reservations about the proposed treatment of Japanese 
Americans.  Brudney has reported Rutledge’s explosion: 
What do you think you are doing?  Don’t you understand that 
there are only nine of us sitting here, and that the generals 
have said this [curfew] is necessary for the preservation and 
security of the country?  Pearl Harbor was attacked and more 
may happen!  Who are we to question this?  What makes you 
think any of us will question this?  Too much is at stake, and 
we are too far removed from the realities.  Cut it out!146 
Even in his state of heightened irritation, Rutledge speaks to Brudney more 
as an equal than as a subordinate.  The “we” who have no right to question 
the generals may be read to include both clerk and Justice, who alike are 
compelled to accept the claim of national security.  The rebuke, though 
vigorous, at no point relies on Brudney’s inferior role of clerk as its basis. 
On a more practical level, the Rutledge clerk participated in every 
phase of the decisionmaking process: 
His attention was directed to every aspect of the Justice’s 
work.  Not only was each case and petition for certiorari a 
candidate for joint examination, but the draft opinions of 
other Justices were regularly left with the clerk for comment 
and frequently for discussion.  And the clerk was expected to 
                                                                                                                          
144 Brudney & Wolfson, supra note 27, at 460.   
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contribute his views as to the result to be reached, as well as 
to the rationale to reach it. Indeed, he was at liberty, one half 
hour before a decision was to be announced, to go into the 
Justice’s office and plead again that he change his vote.147 
One task that a Rutledge clerk did not routinely perform, however, was 
that of drafting opinions.  Rutledge’s preferred writing method was “to 
draft and redraft” himself, a process that began “[a]fter extensive reading 
and discussion of the case with his law clerk.”148  The clerk provided 
research assistance, and occasionally that material might find its way into 
the final opinion: “[I]f the law clerk’s earlier research resulted in a draft 
opinion which coincided with the Justice’s notions of the case, he would 
use it as a text—interlineating, cutting, and adding.”149  But such occasions 
were rare: “More often, he would begin afresh, and, using some of the 
materials from his clerk’s memorandum, he would write, cross out, and 
write again.”150  Rutledge did allow his law clerk to draft one opinion 
during the Court Term; Stevens recalled writing the first draft of both a 
majority opinion and a concurrence during his year.151  The collaborative 
relationship between Rutledge and his clerks extended to preparation for 
the Court’s conferences, a joint process that was both physically and 
intellectually demanding:  
Characteristic of the thoroughness with which he devoted 
himself to that business were the sessions on Friday nights 
before the regular Saturday conferences.  It was his custom— 
until forbidden to do so by his doctor—to sit with his law 
clerk, into the following morning if necessary, and go over in 
detail the cases to be decided and the petitions for certiorari.  
Every memorandum on an in forma pauperis petition, of 
which there were an increasing number during his tenure, 
was carefully read, underlined, and discussed, and if there 
were any doubts, the original, often ill-written papers were 
sent for and examined.152 
The Rutledge clerk, though by no means a full partner in the chambers 
enterprise, was a confidante, a sounding board, and a trusted advisor as 
well as an assistant expected to work as hard as the Justice himself—no 
easy standard to meet. 
Reflecting on the relationship shortly after his own appointment to the 
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Court, Stevens used an intriguing analogy: 
An interesting loyalty develops between clerks and their 
Justices.  It is much like a lawyer-client relationship, close 
and confidential.  Like a lawyer, a clerk can’t tell his client, 
the Justice, what to do.  He can only suggest what can happen 
if he does or doesn’t do something.153 
The clerk as lawyer-advisor carries two burdens, cautioning the Justice on 
consequences as well as preserving the confidentiality of their exchanges, 
an issue that drew increased attention on the Burger Court after the 
revelations of The Brethren in 1979.154  Despite the rigors of his own 
experience with Rutledge, Stevens nonetheless has concluded that “I had a 
lot less responsibility than some of the clerks now.  They are much more 
involved in the entire process now.”155  That conclusion may rest in large 
part on the expanded role currently played by the Court’s law clerks in the 
certiorari process.  Starting in 1972, several Justices—five originally, eight 
on the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts—agreed to pool their law clerks and 
share a single memorandum assessing each cert petition rather than to 
require separate memoranda from their own clerks.156  When Stevens 
joined the Court in 1975, he decided not to participate in the cert pool 
because of his own law clerk experience: “I had some familiarity with cert 
work, and I thought I could get through the certs faster without joining the 
pool.  And that opinion hasn’t changed.”157  He has also observed that “[i]f 
I made all the rules, I don’t think I’d want it,”158 preferring instead to 
secure an independent review from his own clerks, who provide him with 
memos only on the petitions they flag as important.  Stevens has reflected 
on the effect of his practice: 
I have found it necessary to delegate a great deal of 
responsibility in the review of certiorari petitions to my law 
clerks.  They examine them all and select a small minority 
that they believe I should read myself.  As a result, I do not 
                                                                                                                          
153 WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 3, at 245 (footnote omitted). 
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even look at the papers in over eighty percent of the cases 
that are filed.159 
Thus, in different ways, the clerks inside the pool, who collectively 
provide a single review of each cert petition for most of the Justices, and 
Stevens’s own clerks, who themselves scan all petitions, play a large role 
in shaping the Court’s final docket.  Under the Rutledge model, the Justice 
himself saw all the cert petitions, an admittedly far smaller number than 
that filed with the current Court, which would make such a review 
impossibly burdensome.160  Under the Stevens model, the Justice relies on 
his clerks to identify the potentially certworthy petitions on their own.  In 
light of the procedures used both in his own chambers and in the pool, 
Stevens has accurately acknowledged a significant new responsibility that 
has been assigned to the current generation of clerks.  And although 
Stevens has faced reality and departed from the cert practice of the 
Rutledge clerkship, he has retained its spirit, trusting his clerks and relying 
on their counsel in meeting the crucial responsibility for docket formation 
while at the same time making a serious effort to hear the claims of 
“marginalized applicants.”161 
In performing the most important task of a Supreme Court Justice, 
opinion-writing, Stevens has followed not only the spirit but the letter of 
the Rutledge chambers: Stevens is highly unusual among recent Justices in 
consistently writing his own first drafts which, according to former clerks, 
he then gives to a clerk for a thorough review of both content and style.162   
Stevens has offered several explanations for his chosen approach.  He 
notes bluntly that “I’m the one hired to do the job.”163  More expansively, 
he has said that writing the first draft “is for self-discipline.  I don’t really 
understand a case until I write it out.”164  And he has found that his “draft 
is typically much shorter than a law clerk’s draft, and the justice is less 
likely to showboat with long cites and flowery language.”165  Stevens is 
surely justified, at least with regard to his own chambers, in insisting that 
“[t]he justices work very hard.  The idea that the clerks do all the work is 
nutty.”166  At the same time, Stevens expects his clerks to participate fully 
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in the challenging intellectual effort of deciding cases.   Like Rutledge, he 
turns to them for no-holds-barred discussions of pending cases.  According 
to one former clerk, “I can imagine few bosses so interested in the views of 
their employees, so prepared to engage in free-flowing debate, and so 
enthusiastic to be proven wrong.”167  The passage could as easily be 
applied to Rutledge as to Stevens, who seem to have had in common a 
warm relationship with their clerks.168  That kinship is reflected in the 
inscription Stevens writes on the photograph of himself he gives to each 
departing law clerk, “To my friend and former law clerk, with appreciation 
and affection”—precisely the language that Rutledge inscribed on the 
photograph he gave to Stevens at the end of his clerkship year.169 
The tie between Justice and clerk established during their shared Court 
year extended over the brief, fifteen month period between Stevens’s 
departure from the Court and Rutledge’s death.  Rutledge’s papers include 
five letters from Stevens and three responses from Rutledge, and their 
correspondence contains more than thanks for the photograph and 
compliments on some of the Justice’s opinions.170  The former clerk’s 
letters, some typed and some handwritten, vary in length from a short 
cover note for an enclosed article to a seven page letter on personal and 
legal topics.  Stevens writes about the baby he and his wife have adopted, 
and Rutledge responds, eliciting from the proud father agreement that the 
Justice is “correct in assuming that John Joseph is the lord of all he 
surveys.”171  Stevens writes as well about his hope of opening his own 
firm, his reactions to the Alger Hiss trial, and Justice Murphy’s death.172  
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Stevens would smile, thank me, and say something like, ‘You know, I was re-reading the briefs while 
the football game was on last night, and I happened to notice a footnote . . .’  And there might follow a 
satisfying resolution of the case that I had completely overlooked.”  Id. at xxix–xxx.   
169 Richard Brust, Setting Precedent in Two Wars, 48 A.B.A.J. (Sept. 2007), available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/setting_precedent_in_two_wars/print/ (last visited June 28, 
2008).  According to Jeffrey Rosen, “[a] portrait of Rutledge,” presumably the inscribed photograph, 
“hangs in Stevens’s chambers.”  Rosen, supra note 123, at 55. 
170 Letter from John Paul Stevens to Wiley Rutledge (July 11, 1949), available in Rutledge Papers 
Box 46, supra note 134. 
171 Id.; Letter from John Paul Stevens to Wiley Rutledge (Jan. 22, 1949), available in Rutledge 
Papers Box 46, supra note 134. 
172 Letter from John Paul Stevens to Wiley Rutledge (Jan. 22, 1949), available in Rutledge Papers 
Box 46, supra note 134; Letter from John Paul Stevens to Wiley Rutledge (July 11, 1949), available in 
Rutledge Papers Box 46, supra note 134; Letter from John Paul Stevens to Wiley Rutledge (July 22, 
1949), available in Rutledge Papers Box 46, supra note 134.   
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Rutledge sends news of his family vacation and of his trip to visit the ailing 
Victor Brudney, his former clerk, then in a New York hospital.173  The tone 
throughout is sociable and relaxed.  If not exactly colleagues, Rutledge and 
Stevens seem to share an interest in one another’s lives and in their 
continued contact.  The correspondence suggests that Rutledge’s 
inscription was more than a pro forma gesture to a departing clerk.  
Although Stevens is not given to effusive praise, he included Rutledge in a 
select pantheon.  When asked recently about his judicial heroes, he offered 
a brief list: “John Marshall, of course.  And Brandeis, Holmes and Cardozo 
were the three heroes when I was in law school, and I still consider them 
among the greatest to have served on this court.  And, of course, Justice 
Rutledge was and remains a hero.”174 
Whatever influence his year with Rutledge may have had on Stevens’s 
use of his own clerks, there is one extraordinary episode that directly links 
his roles as clerk in 1948 and as Justice more than half a century later in 
2004.  The case of Ahrens v. Clark, which appeared on the Court’s docket 
during the 1947 Term, involved habeas corpus petitions filed by German 
citizens held at Ellis Island under a deportation order.175  The threshold 
issue before the Court was whether, under the habeas statute, the district 
court had jurisdiction to review a habeas petition filed by petitioners 
located outside its territorial jurisdiction.176  In a brief opinion for a six 
Justice majority, Justice Douglas held that the district court did not have 
jurisdiction, but declined to address the further problem of detainees held 
outside the jurisdiction of any federal court.177  Rutledge wrote the dissent, 
joined by Justices Black and Murphy, which argued that the crucial factor 
was the location of the custodian rather than the detainees; since the 
Attorney General was clearly within the district court’s jurisdiction, that 
court could review the habeas petitions.178  As Joseph Thai has 
demonstrated, Stevens played a key role in shaping Rutledge’s dissent.179  
In the draft that Rutledge had requested, Stevens framed the argument later 
presented by the dissent that the location of the petitioner was not 
jurisdictional but instead merely one factor relevant to the question of the 
proper venue.180  Rutledge also adopted Stevens’s critique of the issue 
reserved by the majority; under the Court’s detainee-based rule, Stevens 
                                                                                                                          
173 Letter from Wiley Rutledge to John Paul Stevens (Sept. 17, 1948), available in Rutledge 
Papers Box 46, supra note 134. 
174 Interview, supra note 156. 
175 Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 189 (1948). 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 192–93.  
178 See id. at 194–95, 199–200 (arguing that the detainees’ location is less important than the 
custodian’s location in habeas cases). 
179 See Thai, supra note 116, at 510 (“In critical respects . . . [Rutledge’s draft] incorporated 
Stevens’s arguments into its own.”). 
180 Id. at 508–09. 
 244 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:211 
concluded, “all such questions will in the future be resolved against such 
petitioners.”181  Rewritten by Rutledge, the passage in Ahrens makes that 
point at characteristically greater length: 
For if absence of the body detained from the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the jailer 
creates a total and irremediable void in the court’s capacity to 
act, what lawyers call jurisdiction in the fundamental sense, 
then it is hard to see how that gap can be filled by such 
extraneous considerations as whether there is no other court 
in the place of detention from which remedy might be had . . . 
.182 
Some twenty-five years later, well after Rutledge’s death, and two years 
before Stevens’s Supreme Court appointment, the Court revisited the 
habeas issue expressly decided in Ahrens.  Reversing its course in Braden 
v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, the Court ruled that the 
presence of the custodian within the district court’s jurisdiction was 
sufficient to permit habeas review and read Ahrens as limited to venue 
alone.183  
It took another thirty years for the issue to make its third appearance, 
this time in the context of habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees 
in the district court for the District of Columbia in Rasul v. Bush, where the 
Court held that federal jurisdiction existed.184  Stevens was the key 
protagonist in the third act of this drama.  Not only was he the author of the 
Court’s opinion; as the senior Justice in the majority he had also assigned 
the case to himself.  Furthermore, in a rare theatrical stroke, Stevens 
astonished counsel for both sides by introducing into oral argument a case 
neither side had anticipated as crucial: Ahrens v. Clark.185  The prevailing 
assumption by counsel and by most members of the Court was that the 
controlling case would be Johnson v. Eisentrager, a 1950 decision in 
which the Court found no constitutional basis for review of habeas 
petitions filed by German citizens imprisoned by the United States in 
Germany after their conviction by a military tribunal.186  Stevens’s 
argument in Rasul, addressed repeatedly to bewildered counsel, was that 
Eisentrager had been decided while Ahrens was still good law; once 
Braden overturned Ahrens, however, there was no need of the 
                                                                                                                          
181 Id. at 510. 
182 Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 209. 
183 Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 500 (1973). 
184 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004). 
185 Thai notes, “[n]one of the parties relied on Ahrens or Braden for their jurisdictional 
arguments.”  Thai, supra note 116, at 516.  The government made no mention of either case in its brief; 
the petitioners’ briefs made only slight use of both cases.  Id. at 516–17.  
186 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766–68 (1950). 
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constitutional basis for habeas jurisdiction that the Eisentrager Court found 
lacking.187  The habeas statute itself supported jurisdiction as long as the 
custodian was within the territorial range of the district court, as was the 
situation in Rasul.  After petitioners’ attorney repeatedly missed Stevens’s 
point, he “concluded with a chuckle that counsel would not ‘[l]et me help 
you.’”188  As Thai aptly observes, “[i]n one hour of oral argument, then, 
Justice Stevens managed to undermine the previously unquestioned 
validity of a decades-old decision, and to raise from historical obscurity to 
doctrinal relevance a dissent he had helped draft as a law clerk.”189  If 
petitioners’ counsel rejected Stevens’s help at oral argument, they surely 
appreciated his opinion, which held that “[b]ecause subsequent decisions 
of this Court have filled the statutory gap that had occasioned 
Eisentrager’s resort to ‘fundamentals,’ persons detained outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court no longer need rely on 
the Constitution as the source of their right to federal habeas review.”190 
The remarkable saga of Ahrens v. Clark illustrates both the ties and the 
distinctions between Stevens and Rutledge.  Although Stevens was himself 
a major source of the views advanced in Ahrens, he considers the final 
dissent “by no means [Rutledge’s] finest, . . . nevertheless sufficiently 
representative to provide us with an introduction to its author’s judicial 
career.”191  What Stevens admires in Ahrens is Rutledge’s sense that the 
majority’s decision “‘attenuates the personal security of every citizen.’”192   
The longer passage from the dissent Stevens quotes is indeed characteristic 
of Rutledge’s jurisprudence in its concern for the troubling consequences 
that follow from the holding: the lack of any relief when the petitioner and 
the custodian are located in different judicial districts or, more alarmingly, 
when an American citizen is detained outside U.S. borders.193  Those 
concerns, Stevens insists, “prove” that a five-page majority opinion 
warranted an eighteen-page dissent, another element representative of 
Rutledge’s approach.194  
                                                                                                                          
187 See Thai, supra note 116, at 520.   
188 Id.  Stevens’s comment is partially obscured on the tape of oral argument by laughter, either 
his own, as Thai assumes, or that of others in the courtroom. U.S. Supreme Court Media, 
www.oyez.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2008).  Although the comment does not appear in the written 
transcript provided on the oyez website, it does appear in the version available on the Supreme Court’s 
official website.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446 (2004) (No. 03-334), 
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-334.pdf.  
189 Thai, supra note 116, at 522.  For a detailed analysis of the exchanges concerning Ahrens, see 
id. at 518–22. 
190 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478 (2004). 
191 Stevens, supra note 12, at 178. 
192 Id. at 180 (quoting Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 194 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)). 
193 See Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 195 (1948) (“What also of the situation where [the jail] is 
located in one district, but the jailer is present in and can be served with process only in another?  And 
if the place of detention lies wholly outside the territorial limits of any federal jurisdiction . . . is there 
to be no remedy?”). 
194 Stevens, supra note 12, at 181. 
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Although Stevens does not make the point, Ahrens is representative of 
Rutledge’s work in another way, by asserting broad principles of justice to 
support its position.195  Rutledge makes such assertions twice, in similar 
language.  Early in the dissent, he argues that the Court has avoided narrow 
applications of habeas “out of regard for the writ’s great office in the 
vindication of personal liberty.”196  Towards the end, Rutledge returns to 
the same idea, noting “the writ’s classic availability . . . as a prime 
safeguard of freedom.”197  He also offers a third variation on the theme at 
greater length, insisting that: 
a due and hitherto traditional regard for the writ’s high office 
should dictate resolving any doubt, as between the possible 
constructions, against a jurisdictional limitation so 
destructive of the writ’s availability and adaptability to all the 
varying conditions and devices by which liberty may be 
unlawfully restrained.198 
In contrast, Stevens’s majority opinion in Rasul, a considerably more 
prominent and controversial case, is sixteen pages long, three pages shorter 
than Justice Scalia’s dissent.199  The core section of the opinion is in fact 
only four pages long, an economical account of the impact of Braden on 
Eisentrager that forgoes any celebration of the habeas writ in favor of a 
brief analysis of the sequence of cases.200  Stevens quotes from the Ahrens 
dissent only once, consigning the passage to a footnote, although he does 
include a parenthetical reference in the text naming Rutledge as the 
author.201  The passage itself echoes the technical point from Stevens’s 
original draft: that the issue supposedly reserved by the majority is in fact 
decided, since the Court’s holding would bar habeas jurisdiction in that 
situation.202  Rasul’s final jurisprudential victory is thus shared by Stevens 
with Rutledge, collaborators in the Ahrens dissent, but with a twist: 
Stevens replaces Rutledge’s warm praise of habeas as a protector of 
individual liberty with a coolly restrained analysis of overturned 
precedent.203 
Stevens made clear his sense of the enduring nature of the 
                                                                                                                          
195 Craig Green has celebrated this quality.  “Rutledge’s dissent is just the kind of opinion that 
great judges strive to write: technically dominant without quibbling, normatively grounded without 
preaching, and urgent without fretting.”  Craig Green, Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention, and 
Judicial Conscience at War, 84 WASH. L. REV. 99, 117 (2006).  
196 Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 194. 
197 Id. at 206. 
198 Id. at 206–07. 
199 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470–85, 488–506 (2004).  
200 See id. at 476–79 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s previous habeas cases).  
201 Id. at 477 & n.7. 
202 Id. at 477 n.7. 
203 Green agrees that Stevens’s “affirmative argument for habeas jurisdiction is spare; indeed, 
even its link to Rutledge is underemphasized.”  Green, supra note 195, at 121. 
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jurisprudential bond between Justice and clerk toward the close of the 
Court’s 2006 Term.  In a dissent delivered in part from the bench, Stevens 
criticized Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Uttecht v. Brown, which 
overturned a Ninth Circuit decision by Judge Alex Kozinski upholding a 
trial judge’s refusal to dismiss a juror who voiced reservations about the 
death penalty.204  The critique relied in two respects on the close tie 
between Justice and clerk.  Stevens expressly argued that Kozinski “surely 
was entitled to assume that the law had not changed so dramatically in the 
years following his service as a law clerk to Chief Justice Burger” as to 
support the reversal of a longstanding precedent.205  For Stevens, then, the 
law clerk retains a particularly acute sense of the law as he or she knew it 
during the clerkship year, much as Stevens was apparently alone in 
appreciating the impact of Ahrens on Eisentrager.  Linda Greenhouse has 
also pointed out, however, a subtler “subtext” to Stevens’s observation 
about Kennedy and Kozinski: 
Justice Kennedy and Judge Kozinski are particularly close. 
Justice Kennedy was himself once a judge on the Ninth 
Circuit, and Alex Kozinski was his law clerk.  And Justice 
Kennedy regularly hires Judge Kozinski’s law clerks to work 
at the Supreme Court.206 
Greenhouse reads what she terms Stevens’s “oblique but unmistakable 
reference in print to this special relationship” as “an expression of the 
liberal justices’ frustration with how the term is going,” including an 
anticipation, later proved accurate, that the same majority would also 
reverse the Ninth Circuit decision, supported by Kozinski, upholding the 
Seattle school system’s integration plan.207  In this second sense, the 
Justice-clerk bond—now conceptualized as linking the Justice to his 
former clerk rather than vice versa—makes Kennedy’s willingness to 
overturn at least one, and possibly two, Kozinski decisions of particular 
note as a sign of an emerging tendency to abandon precedent and vote with 
a new conservative bloc.  Stevens’s observation in dissent may thus be 
taken as an additional, though indirect, acknowledgment of the potent and 
lasting tie between Justice and clerk.  
                                                                                                                          
204 See Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218, 2243–44 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brown v. 
Lambert, 431 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2005).   
205 Uttecht, 127 S. Ct. at 2244. 
206 Linda Greenhouse, Ruling Helps Prosecutors in Death Penalty Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 
2007, at A16, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
207 Id.  See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 
(2007) (reversing Ninth Circuit decision).  For Kozinski’s concurring opinion, see 426 F.3d 1168, 1193 
(9th Cir. 2005).       
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 C.  The Opinions: The Voice of a Maverick 
It is much more challenging to select a representative slice of Stevens’s 
Supreme Court canon than of Rutledge’s.  The numbers tell part of the 
story.  In his six plus Terms on the Court, Rutledge wrote 169 opinions.  
Stevens, currently in his thirty-third full Term, has already written more 
than seven times that number, an impressive total of 1,385 opinions 
(through the 2007 Term).208  Of those, 384 are opinions for the Court, 324 
concurrences, and 677 dissents.  In each of his two most productive Terms, 
1983 and 1985, he wrote sixty-eight opinions.  And in twenty-two of the 
full Terms he has served, Stevens has written more opinions than any of 
his colleagues.209  The task of identifying a handful of representative 
opinions from such a massive body of work is surely daunting. 
The numbers, however, provide only part of the challenge.  Stevens’s 
positions on some issues have changed over his long tenure, leading some 
observers to assume that his jurisprudence has become more liberal over 
the years.  In the celebrated 1978 Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke decision allowing some use of race in university admissions, for 
example, Stevens wrote for the bloc of Justices who found the affirmative 
action program at issue a statutory violation and declined to address the 
constitutional question that the bloc led by Justice Brennan found 
dispositive.210  Yet Stevens subsequently voted to support affirmative 
action programs for both university admissions and government 
contracting, joining the majority in Grutter v. Bollinger211 and dissenting 
vigorously in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena to insist that the 
majority’s reliance on consistency in the treatment of majority and 
minority races “would disregard the difference between a ‘No Trespassing’ 
sign and a welcome mat.”212  More dramatically, in the Court’s last Term, 
Stevens announced for the first time his conclusion that, in light of “the 
diminishing force of the principal rationales for retaining the death 
penalty,”213 he now considers it to be unconstitutional as a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment.214  In a recent New York Times interview, Stevens 
dismissed the notion that he has metamorphosed into a liberal Justice: “He 
                                                                                                                          
208 These statistics and those that follow are drawn from the tables that accompany the Harvard 
Law Review’s annual survey of the Supreme Court Term.  The figures for the 2007 Term are based on 
the opinions as reported on the Supreme Court’s website.  See Supreme Court Opinions, 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/opinions.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2008). 
209 In the 1987 and 1993 Terms, Stevens tied with Scalia for the highest number of opinions 
written, 42 and 33, respectively.  Stevens’s reduced output in more recent years is presumably 
attributable at least in part to the Court’s reduced docket.  
210 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 417–18 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring); 
id. at 324–26 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
211 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 310, 343–44 (2003). 
212 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
213 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1548 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
214 See id. at 1551.  
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considers himself a ‘judicial conservative,’ he said, and only appears 
liberal today because he has been surrounded by increasingly conservative 
colleagues.”215  That observation suggests another factor—the Court’s 
changing composition over a long period—that makes it difficult to 
examine in isolation a small but truly representative sample of Stevens’s 
jurisprudence. 
There are, nonetheless, some consistent strains in his work that those 
writing about Stevens have identified.  Perhaps the most prominent of 
these is his independence of mind.  Justice Brennan observed hearing “my 
friend John Paul Stevens described as a ‘maverick’ because he so often 
takes unique positions on Supreme Court cases.”216  That word appears as 
well in William Popkin’s collection of similar epithets that other readers of 
Stevens’s opinions have applied: “enigmatic, unpredictable, [a] maverick, 
a wild card, a loner.”217  Gregory Magarian targeted another aspect of those 
opinions, finding that “[i]f any single word can describe Justice John Paul 
Stevens’s approach to judicial decisionmaking, the word is ‘pragmatic.’”218  
One aspect of that pragmatism is Stevens’s insistence on looking at each 
case as a discrete legal package and relying on its distinctive features—
whether facts or procedural history or consequences—as the determining 
factors in its resolution.  As Norman Dorsen has observed, Stevens 
“eschews bright-line rules in favor of standards that permit judges adequate 
discretion to tailor results to nuanced evaluation of facts and 
circumstances.”219  Both these jurisprudential tendencies result in what 
Robert Nagel has described as Stevens’s “invigorating (if sometimes 
eccentric) willingness to rethink and, some would say, to disregard 
established doctrinal formulations,”220 the most celebrated example being 
his continuing rejection of the Court’s multi-tiered equal protection 
analysis on the ground that “[t]here is only one Equal Protection 
Clause.”221  This innovative quality in Stevens’s approach complicates 
further the selection of a definitively representative sample of his opinions.  
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some opinions that, precisely because 
of their distinctive approaches, contain the hallmarks of his independent 
and pragmatic jurisprudence.  Not surprisingly, Stevens’s most 
characteristic opinions, like Rutledge’s, tend to be dissents and 
                                                                                                                          
215 Rosen, supra note 123, at 52. 
216 William J. Brennan, Tribute to Justice Stevens, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xxi. 
217 William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of Justice 
Stevens, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1088.  For the source of each epithet, see id. at n.1.  
218 Gregory P. Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens’s Free Speech 
Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2201 (2006).  Norman Dorsen has made a similar point, 
describing Stevens as “a pragmatist—cautious, realistic, practical.”  Dorsen, supra note 124, at xxvi. 
219 Dorsen, supra note 124, at xxvi. 
220 Robert F. Nagel, Six Opinions by Mr. Justice Stevens: A New Methodology for Constitutional 
Cases?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 509, 510 (2003). 
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concurrences rather than majority holdings. 
In fact, despite his long tenure, Stevens also resembles Rutledge in 
not—at least until recently—having authored many of the Supreme Court’s 
high profile majority opinions.  Writing in 2005, Stevens noted that his 
“opinion for the Court in the Chevron case has been cited more frequently 
than any other opinion that I have written.”222  Although Chevron 
illustrates Stevens’s willingness to defer to other government entities, in 
that case the Environmental Protection Agency,223 it does not capture the 
distinctive quality of his separate opinions.  And although his majority 
opinion in Kelo v. City of New London was one of the Court’s most 
controversial decisions in recent years, it too lacks the characteristic 
Stevens stamp.  Writing for a five Justice majority, Stevens laid out in a 
workmanlike manner the history and precedents of the public use doctrine 
to uphold New London’s exercise of eminent domain over private property 
to further the city’s economic development plan.224  The opinion is 
relatively brief (eighteen pages), contains twenty-four footnotes, and uses 
no dramatic diction; its restrained tone is in marked contrast to the furor it 
aroused.  In the opinion’s final paragraph, Stevens offers a practical 
response to anticipated criticism, noting calmly that “nothing in our 
opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on its exercise 
of the takings power.”225  The opinion reflects Stevens’s pragmatic bent, if 
not his maverick tendencies.  Reflecting on Kelo’s harsh reception from 
property rights advocates, Stevens was philosophical: “‘I sympathize with 
all that, but I thought that was a clear case of what the law compelled.’  He 
added: ‘It’s part of the job to write unpopular decisions.  No doubt about 
it.’”226 
Some of his other majority opinions do at least suggest his maverick 
tendencies.  In Young v. American Mini Theatres, an early opinion written 
in his first Term on the Court, Stevens upheld ordinances restricting the 
location of adult movie theaters over a First Amendment challenge.227  The 
final section of the opinion, joined by only three Justices, took a more 
independent turn as Stevens argued that a content-based distinction 
offering less protection to sexual materials was appropriate because “it is 
                                                                                                                          
222 Stevens, supra note 119, at 278–79.  For Stevens’s opinion in that case, see Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839 (1984).  
223 Stevens wrote that, in cases of statutory construction by federal agencies on matters of policy, 
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those who do.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866. 
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225 Id. at 489. 
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that the outcome in Kelo was “entirely divorced from my judgment concerning the wisdom of the 
program.”  Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 
2005, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
227 Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976). 
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manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a 
wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled 
political debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal comment.”228  (That 
comment, which opens the final section, is Voltaire’s assertion that “I 
disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say 
it,”229 an infrequent, though by no means unique, use by Stevens of a 
literary reference to sharpen a point).230  Stevens employed a vivid 
example to illustrate the difference he finds between varieties of speech: 
“But few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve 
the citizen’s right to see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the 
theaters of our choice.”231  The example is interesting for both its 
hyperbole and its inclusion of “daughters” in a 1976 opinion.  Although 
Stevens had taken his oath of office only six months earlier, he had no 
hesitation about advancing a significant departure from First Amendment 
doctrine, one that to date has never commanded a majority.  Two years 
later, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, Stevens repeated the point, this time 
to explain that the indecent, though not obscene, language of the George 
Carlin monologue at issue did not occupy a “place in the hierarchy of First 
Amendment values” meriting constitutional protection.232  Once again, this 
section of Stevens’s majority opinion did not command a majority; only 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined. 
Stevens’s role as majority author has been transformed by the passage 
of years, and in this sense he has fared better than Rutledge.  Stevens’s 
long tenure has given him seniority second only to that of the Chief Justice 
and with it the power to assign cases whenever the Chief is not in the 
majority.  The result, as Kelo demonstrates, is that Stevens has chosen to 
write in some of the Court’s most controversial cases, including Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the case striking down President Bush’s use of military 
commissions to try Guantanamo detainees.233  Hamdan, discussed below, 
is also a case that, like Rasul v. Bush, suggests enduring jurisprudential ties 
between Stevens and Rutledge, ties of more substance than their shared 
propensity to voice their disagreements with their colleagues.  Nonetheless, 
for both Justices, their majority opinions are less revealing than their 
separate opinions. 
Thus, the maverick strain in Stevens is most on display in his dissents 
and concurrences.  Although a dissent by definition is a rejection of a 
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consensus position in favor of an opposed perspective, Stevens’s dissents 
at times express a more complicated divergence from the majority than 
disagreement on the merits.  When dissenting from the merits of a majority 
opinion, Stevens may offer an additional technical basis for disposal of the 
case.  In Troxel v. Granville, where the Court found a substantive due 
process violation in a state statute authorizing grandparent visitation over 
the objections of the child’s mother, Stevens countered that the Due 
Process Clause allows states “to consider the impact on a child of possibly 
arbitrary parental decisions . . . .”234  But before addressing the merits, he 
first argued that the Court, which “wisely declines to endorse” the state 
court holding, “would have been even wiser to deny certiorari,”235 a view 
reminiscent of Rutledge’s doctrine of restraint in Rescue Army.  Even when 
dissenting in a case addressing a controversial issue on which he has 
previously expressed strong views, Stevens may base his opinion on a 
procedural rather than a substantive position.  In Gratz v. Bollinger, 
Stevens devoted his entire dissent to the argument that, since both the 
petitioners objecting to the University of Michigan’s undergraduate 
admission policy had enrolled in other schools and were not contemplating 
transfer applications, the Court’s precedents “require[d] dismissal of the 
action” for lack of standing.236 
More conventionally, Stevens may disagree solely on substantive 
grounds, but in so doing he may offer a legal theory that none of his 
dissenting colleagues accepts.  In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 
for example, Stevens rejected the plurality’s view that the “role model” 
theory was “not sufficiently narrowly tailored” to justify an affirmative 
action layoff plan favoring retention of minority teachers with less 
seniority than their white counterparts.237  Stevens also, however, rejected 
Justice Marshall’s cautious dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Blackmun, which argued that the Court should have deferred to the terms 
of the collective bargaining agreement without reaching the constitutional 
issue.238  Instead, Stevens wrote alone to insist that the necessary question 
in the case was “whether the Board’s action advances the public interest in 
educating children for the future.”239  Finding that “it is quite obvious that a 
school board may reasonably conclude that an integrated faculty will be 
able to provide benefits to the student body that could not be provided by 
                                                                                                                          
234 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
235 Id. at 80. 
236 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 282 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
237 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283–84 (1986). 
238 Id. at 312 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Marshall insisted that, in light of the “settlement achieved 
under the auspices of a supervisory state agency charged with protecting the civil rights of all citizens, 
that provision should not be upset by this Court on constitutional grounds.”  Id. 
239 Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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an all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty,”240 Stevens viewed the affirmative 
action provision as “a step toward that ultimate goal of eliminating entirely 
from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factors as a human 
being’s race.”241  The opinion is in many respects a typical Stevens dissent: 
short (seven pages), abundantly footnoted (sixteen footnotes), forthright, 
and unapologetically based on a legal approach that departs from both the 
Court’s rationale and the dissent’s objections.   
Stevens has also found stylistic methods of injecting an individualistic 
note into his dissents.  He has introduced a passage from one of his 
Seventh Circuit opinions, prefaced by, “As I wrote some years ago,” to 
support a point.242  In his more recent dissents, he has used “I” more 
insistently, noting in one brief opinion that “I think not,” “I see no 
constitutional violation,” and “I am persuaded,” before concluding that 
“[e]ven if I agreed with Part II of the majority opinion, however, I would 
not reach out . . . to decide a constitutional question that was not addressed 
by either the District Court or the Court of Appeals.”243  He has also made 
clear his sense that personal experience informs a Justice’s jurisprudence, 
observing in a campaign finance case that the compelling interest in 
limiting candidates’ expenditures has been recognized “by Justice White—
who not incidentally had personal experience as an active participant in a 
Presidential campaign.”244   
At the same time, he has also made clear the need to separate, on 
occasion, such personal experience from the judicial role, as when 
qualifying his support for the majority’s acceptance of the First 
Amendment implications of the Child Online Protection Act: 
As a parent, grandparent, and great-grandparent, I endorse 
that [statutory] goal without reservation.  As a judge, 
however, I must confess to a growing sense of unease when 
the interest in protecting children from prurient materials is 
invoked as a justification for using criminal regulation of 
speech as a substitute for, or a simple backup to, adult 
oversight of children’s viewing habits.245 
Most notably, in the pupil assignment case of the 2006 Term, Stevens 
personalized his disagreement with the Chief Justice’s citation of Brown v. 
Board of Education in support of the majority holding by referring directly, 
in his concluding words, to the changing composition of the Court and his 
                                                                                                                          
240 Id. at 315. 
241 Id. at 320. 
242 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
243 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 131, 133–34 (2001) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).   
244 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 278–79 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
245 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 675 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).   
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own tenure on it: 
The Court has changed significantly since it decided 
School Comm. of Boston in 1968.  It was then more faithful 
to Brown and more respectful of our precedent than it is 
today.  It is my firm conviction that no Member of the Court 
that I joined in 1975 would have agreed with today’s 
decision.246 
That passage ranks among the most personal—and most candid about 
Court voting patterns—since Justice Blackmun’s poignant reference, in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, to his advanced age and his imminent 
departure from the Court, with its potential consequences for abortion 
rights.247     
Despite these moments of direct personal discourse, Stevens does not 
use the dissent as an occasion for personalizing his objections to the work 
of his colleagues.  As a dissenter, he remains calm and courteous even 
when offering harsh criticism of the majority’s position.  In Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale, where Stevens criticized the harm caused by “atavistic 
opinions” about racial groups and homosexuals, he avoided directing 
blame to members of the majority, instead regretting the aggravation of 
that harm “by the creation of a constitutional shield for a policy that is 
itself the product of a habitual way of thinking about strangers.”248  Though 
strongly critical of the majority’s methodology, Stevens ended his dissent 
on a hopeful rather than accusatory note: “If we would guide by the light of 
reason, we must let our minds be bold.”249  His focus was on the 
implications of the decision for the future rather than on the errors of his 
colleagues.  Justice Blackmun, a long-time colleague, has praised 
                                                                                                                          
246 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2800 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  Stevens opens his dissent by finding “a cruel irony” in Roberts’s reliance on 
Brown and insists that “[t]he Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this Court’s most important 
decisions.”  Id. at 2797–98.  Stevens has struck a personal note in several other recent cases as well.  In 
Morse v. Frederick, a case dealing with student speech about drug use, he referred in dissent to “the 
opinion that supported the nationwide ban on alcohol when I was a student.”  Morse v. Frederick, 127 
S. Ct. 2618, 2651 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Two years earlier, dissenting from a majority 
decision holding that state statutes banning interstate wine shipments to consumers were a burden on 
interstate commerce, he relied on “[m]y understanding (and recollection) of the historical context” of 
state regulation following the repeal of Prohibition in reaching his position.  Granholm v. Heald, 544 
U.S. 460, 496 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  More broadly, in announcing last Term that he now 
finds the death penalty unconstitutional, he noted that “I have relied on my own experience.”  Baze v. 
Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1551 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).   
247 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).  
The passage reads: “I am 83 years old.  I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step 
down, the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue before us today.  That, I 
regret, may be exactly where the choice between the two worlds will be made.”  Id.   
248 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 699–700 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
249 Id. at 700.  Stevens notes that the majority’s “conclusion, remarkably, rests entirely on 
statements in BSA’s briefs,” which he finds both “an astounding view of the law” and “an odd form of 
independent review.”  Id. at 685–86. 
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Stevens’s graciousness in dissent: “Whenever he has been disappointed in 
a result reached by the Court, he never has displayed bitterness or pettiness 
or engaged in personal attack.”250 
That same inclination is illustrated by one of the most provocative 
cases in recent memory, Bush v. Gore.251  In the conclusion to Stevens’s 
dissent, probably the most quoted language of the decision, he maintains 
his usual demeanor, which one observer has described as “unfailingly 
polite.”252  The passage opens by identifying the basis of the petitioners’ 
argument as “an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and 
capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the 
vote count were to proceed.”253  His criticism of the majority’s support for 
that position, though strongly worded, is also deflected from the Justices 
themselves to the consequences of their holding, which “can only lend 
credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the 
land.”254  Although the passage that follows may be among Stevens’s 
fiercest, it targets not his misguided colleagues but the broad harm he 
anticipates from their ruling: 
It is confidence in the men and women who administer the 
judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of law.  
Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence that will 
be inflicted by today’s decision.  One thing, however, is 
certain.  Although we may never know with complete 
certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential 
election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear.  It is the 
Nation’s confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of 
the rule of law.255 
The passage strikes several notes characteristic of Stevens’s jurisprudence 
in its blend of personal restraint, concern for practical consequences, and 
respect for other government actors.  For Stevens, the dissent is an 
instrument not of angry remonstrance but of pragmatically principled 
reflection. 
The opinion form that most precisely reflects Stevens’s independent 
bent is the concurrence.  Stevens has perfected the art of the minimalist 
concurrence: an opinion that is surprisingly brief, sometimes no more than 
a single paragraph, yet sweeping in its range.  In Nixon v. United States, for 
                                                                                                                          
250 Harry A. Blackmun, A Tribute, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xix, xix. 
251 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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253 Bush, 531 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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example, where the Court held an impeached federal judge’s claim of 
improper Senate trial procedure barred by the political question doctrine,256 
Stevens joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion, which relied 
heavily on the constitutional text assigning the Senate “the sole Power to 
try all Impeachments.”257  Stevens, however, dismissed the textual sparring 
of majority and dissenting Justices as “far less significant than the central 
fact that the Framers decided to assign the impeachment power to the 
Legislative Branch.”258  On this issue, text gives way to the dominant 
principle of “[r]espect for a coordinate branch of Government,”259 and no 
more needs to be said.  A similar single paragraph concurrence in Stenberg 
v. Carhart, this time joined by Justice Ginsburg,260 prefers to resolve the 
hotly disputed issue of the constitutionality of a state “partial birth 
abortion” statute by means of an unadorned fact: “The rhetoric is almost, 
but not quite, loud enough to obscure the quiet fact that during the past 27 
years, the central holding of Roe v. Wade . . . has been endorsed by all but 
4 of the 17 Justices who have addressed the issue.”261  In a tone of polite 
bewilderment, Stevens observes that this fact “makes it impossible for me 
to understand” the legitimate state interest in banning this procedure in 
favor of another.262  The constitutional contest between “two equally 
gruesome procedures” is thus, in his view, “simply irrational,” among the 
most severe condemnations in Stevens’s judicial lexicon.263  In yet another 
of his brief, pointed concurrences, Stevens makes no mention of either 
majority or dissenting opinions in City of Boerne v. Flores, choosing 
instead simply to state his basis for finding the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act in violation of the First Amendment for its special 
treatment of church property under a zoning ordinance: “[T]he statute has 
provided the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can 
obtain.  This governmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, 
is forbidden by the First Amendment.”264 
Stevens’s insistence on rationality as a touchstone appears in a more 
elaborate concurrence in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
where the Court struck down a zoning ordinance requiring a special use 
                                                                                                                          
256 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993). 
257 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
258 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
259 Id. 
260 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 946 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
261 Id. (citation omitted). 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 946–47. 
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permit for a group home for the mentally retarded.265  The focus of 
Stevens’s opinion is the Court’s multi-tiered equal protection analysis, long 
a bone of contention for him.  Arguing instead for a single rational basis 
standard, he offers his own definition: “The term ‘rational,’ of course, 
includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe 
that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that 
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class.”266  
Applying that standard to the case at hand, Stevens finds more expansively 
that not only the impartial lawmaker but also a member of the 
disadvantaged class would reject the ordinance.  By the final sentence, the 
“rational” label has itself shifted from the ordinance to the class member, 
with Stevens concluding, “I cannot believe that a rational member of this 
disadvantaged class could ever approve of the discriminatory application 
of the city’s ordinance in this case.”267  The rationality of ordinance and 
victim merge to provide Stevens’s independent basis for joining the 
majority.   
Stevens parts company more emphatically with the plurality opinion in 
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, concurring only in the judgment striking 
down another zoning ordinance, this one narrowly defining the family unit 
that may inhabit a residence.268  Justice Powell’s opinion relies on 
substantive due process doctrine to find a liberty interest in the definition 
of family units.  Stevens, writing only for himself, redefines the issue as 
“whether East Cleveland’s housing ordinance is a permissible restriction 
on appellant’s right to use her own property as she sees fit.”269  Where the 
plurality opinion cites cases concerning individual rights, Stevens cites 
property law decisions.  He too finds violation of a fundamental right, but 
for him it is “a fundamental right normally associated with the ownership 
of residential property” whose violation “constitutes a taking . . . without 
due process and without just compensation.”270  This is the voice of the 
maverick Justice, finding an independent route to the same destination, one 
that no other Justice endorses. 
D.  Two Justices: Jurisprudential Intersections 
As the earlier discussion of Rasul v. Bush illustrates, Stevens found in 
the reversal of a Rutledge decision of his clerkship year, Ahrens v. Clark, 
both a vindication of the Rutledge dissent and a potent source for his own 
majority opinion a generation later.  That line of influence emerged again 
                                                                                                                          
265 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).   
266 Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring).   
267 Id. at 455.   
268  Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion).   
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in another case dealing with the habeas rights of detainees held by the 
government as enemy combatants.  This time, however, the influence 
extended beyond the doctrinal impact to include another strain in 
Rutledge’s jurisprudence: the willingness to rely less on technical legal 
analysis than on the broad principles of justice and fairness that Rutledge 
identified as the foundation of the American legal system. 
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, Stevens dissented from the majority’s holding 
that the District Court for the Southern District of New York lacked 
jurisdiction over the Secretary of Defense to hear a habeas petition from a 
United States citizen transferred by the President from federal criminal 
custody to military custody in South Carolina as an enemy combatant.271  
Stevens’s opinion relies in part on the same sequence of decisions—Ahrens 
reversed by Braden—that he found controlling in Rasul, noting that Braden 
effectively “decoupled the District Court’s jurisdiction from the detainee’s 
place of confinement and adopted for unusual cases a functional analysis 
that does not depend on the physical location of any single party.”272  In 
addition to that functional analysis, however, Stevens argues that the most 
fundamental principles of due process also support the district court’s 
exercise of habeas jurisdiction:  
At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a 
free society.  Even more important than the method of 
selecting the people’s rulers and their successors is the 
character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the 
rule of law.  Unconstrained executive detention for the 
purpose of investigating and preventing subversive activity is 
the hallmark of the Star Chamber.  Access to counsel for the 
purpose of protecting the citizen from official mistakes and 
mistreatment is the hallmark of due process.273 
Quoting Justice Frankfurter, Stevens relies as well on non-legal sources of 
information, insisting that “‘there comes a point where this Court should 
not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men.’”274  The opinion ends 
with a rhetorical flourish more characteristic of Rutledge than of Stevens: 
“For if this Nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it 
must not wield the tools of tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of 
tyranny.”275  Just as Yamashita elicited Rutledge’s most sweeping rhetoric, 
so the detainee habeas cases seem to draw Stevens, ordinarily the calmest 
of stylists, closer to the voice of the Justice for whom he clerked. 
It is, however, worth noting that in a related case, Hamdan v. 
                                                                                                                          
271 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004). 
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Rumsfeld, where Stevens wrote for the majority to hold that the military 
commissions created to try Guantanamo detainees violated both the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions, that 
sweeping rhetoric is absent.276  In a lengthy opinion, Stevens systematically 
reviews the procedures set forth for the commissions and finds no basis for 
their departure from the standards of the Uniform Code and the Geneva 
Conventions, with particular reliance on Common Article 3.277  The tone of 
those sections of the opinion is measured and restrained, reminiscent in 
some ways of the tone of the sections of Rutledge’s dissent in Yamashita 
analyzing the procedural violations of the Japanese general’s 1945 war 
crimes trial by military commission.278  While Rutledge framed those 
sections of his dissent with introductory and concluding passages that 
spoke in passionate and personal terms of the profound flaws he identified, 
Stevens avoids such language.  Early in his opinion Rutledge announces 
that “I am forced to speak” by the violations of “the basic standards of trial 
which, among other guaranties, the nation fought to keep” and which “this 
Court shall not fail in its part” to protect.279  His conclusion, quoted at 
length earlier,280 also speaks strongly in the first person as Rutledge insists 
that “I cannot consent to even implied departure from that great absolute” 
of trial protections, the Fifth Amendment.281 
Although Stevens does not write with Rutledge’s personal intensity, he 
does acknowledge, somewhat ambiguously, the force of the earlier 
opinion, noting that “[t]he procedures and rules of evidence employed 
during Yamashita’s trial departed so far from those used in courts-martial 
that they generated an unusually long and vociferous critique from two 
Members of this Court”282 and quoting a passage from the dissent in a 
footnote.283  Only in his own conclusion does Stevens offer a generalized 
statement of the majority’s holding, though his rhetoric is notably mild and 
understated: “But in undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to 
criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the Rule of 
Law that prevails in this jurisdiction.”284  If Stevens considers Rutledge’s 
dissenting language to be “vociferous,” scarcely a term of high praise, his 
own tendency is to make a similar point in a remarkably quiet judicial 
voice. 
Of course, a significant difference between Stevens’s Padilla and 
                                                                                                                          
276 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2759 (2006). 
277 Id. at 2786–98. 
278 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 48–78 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
279 Id. at 42. 
280 See supra notes 56–71 and accompanying text (discussing Rutledge’s dissent in Yamashita).  
281 Id. at 81.  For the expanded passage, see supra text accompanying note 70. 
282 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2789.  Rutledge’s dissent was joined by Justice Murphy.  Yamashita, 
327 U.S. at 81. 
283 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2789 n.46. 
284 Id. at 2798. 
 260 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:211 
Hamdan opinions is the simple fact that one is a dissent and the other a 
majority opinion.  Like many Justices, Stevens may well believe that, even 
on a controversial issue of such weight, the majority author should refrain 
from striking any unnecessarily dramatic rhetorical notes.285  Deliberate 
restraint is, however, characteristic of Stevens’s opinions, whether majority 
or minority and regardless of the depth of emotion engendered by the issue 
at hand.  Perhaps the best example of that restraint appears in a strongly 
felt dissent from the Court’s celebrated decision striking down the Texas 
flag-burning statute.  In Texas v. Johnson, Stevens writes separately to 
insist that the flag’s “unique” nature as the symbol of American history and 
values gives “this case . . . an intangible dimension” that frees it from First 
Amendment rules that the Court properly applies in other contexts.286  He 
argues that a national flag may carry a message that survives and 
transcends its historical roots: 
So it is with the American flag.  It is more than a proud 
symbol of the courage, the determination, and the gifts of 
nature that transformed 13 fledgling Colonies into a world 
power.  It is a symbol of freedom, of equal opportunity, of 
religious tolerance, and of good will for other peoples who 
share our aspirations.287 
The message is a potent one, but the language conveying it is unadorned 
and conventional.  Even when Stevens reaches the conclusion of his 
dissent, a tribute to American leaders motivated by the symbolic power of 
the flag, his diction remains earthbound: 
The ideas of liberty and equality have been an irresistible 
force in motivating leaders like Patrick Henry, Susan B. 
Anthony, and Abraham Lincoln, schoolteachers like Nathan 
Hale and Booker T. Washington, the Philippine Scouts who 
fought at Bataan, and the soldiers who scaled the bluff at 
Omaha Beach.  If those ideas are worth fighting for—and our 
history demonstrates that they are—it cannot be true that the 
flag that uniquely symbolizes their power  is not itself worthy 
of protection from unnecessary desecration.288 
It is characteristic of Stevens’s style that the most striking element of 
his dissent is not its rhetoric but its comparison of flag desecration with the 
act of spray-painting an image onto the Lincoln Memorial’s façade.289  
                                                                                                                          
285 Hugo Black, for example, observed that “[m]ajority opinions could not be eloquent.”  ROGER 
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Both varieties of desecration, he concludes, are equally unprotected by the 
First Amendment and equally subject to sanction.290  It is hardly surprising 
that Stevens chose not to join the hyperbolic Rehnquist dissent that 
combines long excerpts of flag poetry and assorted flag lore to make a 
similar point about symbolic values.291  For Stevens, less is generally more 
when he chooses the most appropriate form for his ideas, however strongly 
held.292  
The second major point of intersection between Rutledge and Stevens 
is the Establishment Clause.  While the Everson v. Board of Education 
dissent is one of Rutledge’s signature opinions,293  Stevens has no readily 
comparable opinion on the same issue.  He has, however, authored dissents 
of his own which illustrate the links and the distinctions between the two 
Justices.  Although they both strongly support a sharply defined line of 
separation between government and religion, their methodologies when 
faced with the issue tend to diverge.  Where Rutledge relies on his broad 
vision of the First Amendment to support his positions, Stevens is more 
comfortable building a logical argument that focuses more directly on the 
specific circumstances of the case. 
In Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, Stevens filed 
a dissent from the Court’s holding that a government body did not violate 
the Establishment Clause by permitting the Ku Klux Klan to erect a Latin 
cross on state property surrounding the capitol building in Columbus, 
Ohio.294  Stevens’s opinion opens with a reference to Jefferson’s wall of 
separation that in turn incorporates a reference to the details of the record: 
“[T]he sequence of sectarian displays disclosed by the record in this case 
illustrates the importance of rebuilding the ‘wall of separation between 
church and State’ that Jefferson envisioned.”295  The body of the opinion 
then pursues the implications of that record, particularly the response of a 
“reasonable person” to a religious symbol on state property.296  Stevens 
takes exception to Justice O’Connor’s “reasonable observer” as not just “a 
legal fiction” but, more critically, “a well-schooled jurist, a being finer than 
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the tort-law model” who knows too much to serve as the appropriate 
measure for her endorsement test.297  Stevens’s preference is for a less 
idealized observer.  He “would extend protection to the universe of 
reasonable persons and ask whether some viewers of the religious display 
would be likely to perceive a government endorsement,”298 though without 
expecting those viewers to have any knowledge of First Amendment 
doctrine.  Rejecting the plurality’s reliance on the nature of a public forum, 
he finds it “presumptuous to consider such knowledge a precondition of 
Establishment Clause protection.”299  Stevens’s test is based on the 
common sense reaction of an ordinary person to a particular object, once 
again the mark of the pragmatic strain in his jurisprudence.  And, in a final 
bow to that pragmatism, he allows readers to test themselves by examining 
the photograph of the Klan’s Latin cross that he appends to his opinion.300 
Stevens does not, however, rest his dissent exclusively on the response 
of the reasonable person.  Instead, the final section of his opinion reverses 
course from the particular to the abstract.  Stevens first complains that 
“[c]onspicuously absent from the plurality’s opinion is any mention of the 
values served by the Establishment Clause.”301  He then proceeds to fill 
that gap by providing extended quotations from Everson—first from 
Justice Black’s majority opinion, which traced the history of religious 
strife that preceded the First Amendment and endorsed Jefferson’s view of 
separation of church and State, and then from Justice Jackson’s dissent, 
which read the First Amendment as not only enforcing that separation but 
also “‘keep[ing] bitter religious controversy out of public life.’”302  The 
curious omission is any reference to Rutledge’s dissent, itself a resonant, 
often quoted call for complete separation.  Whatever ambivalence about 
Rutledge that omission suggests, Stevens has, however inadvertently, 
echoed the tension in Rutledge’s jurisprudence between specific detail and 
abstract principle with his own blend of particular factual context and 
constitutional values.303 
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303 Another example of that blend occurs in the final paragraph of Stevens’s dissent in another 
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As opinion writers, Rutledge and Stevens share several tendencies.  
Both have distinguished themselves as authors of separate opinions who 
have spoken most memorably in dissent or concurrence.  Both have shown 
a particular interest in issues of individual rights, the Establishment Clause, 
and the reach of executive power in wartime, grounding their opinions in 
the particular factual context of each case.  Both display an academic’s 
affinity for documentation through copious footnotes; Stevens has in fact 
recently confessed that “I am somewhat addicted to footnotes.”304  And 
both have consistently written the first drafts of their opinions, majority as 
well as separate, in the face of the increasingly dominant practice of 
delegating virtually all such drafting to law clerks.   
In one significant respect, however, Rutledge and Stevens diverge.  
Even his most loyal admirers, Stevens included, admit that Rutledge was 
prone to long-winded and repetitious rhetoric, a practice Stevens has 
defended as “deliberately chosen to give full expression to his precise 
meaning” but not himself adopted.305  Instead, Stevens has taken the 
opposite path, often preferring to write short, trenchant separate opinions, 
sometimes no more than a single paragraph, to make his point with 
economy.  Those short opinions, so different from Rutledge’s lengthy 
discourses, have the added virtue of efficiency.  For a Justice who values 
the freedom to write often—as many as sixty-eight opinions in a single 
term—one of the lessons of a Rutledge clerkship may well have been an 
appreciation of the need to husband judicial energy for purposes of 
increased productivity. 
Rutledge and Stevens also diverge significantly as stylists.  Where 
Rutledge favored resonant and dramatic diction, as in the often quoted 
conclusion to his Yamashita dissent, Stevens prefers to use plain diction, 
even in such strongly felt opinions as his Texas v. Johnson dissent.  As a 
result, Stevens’s opinions tend to be less quotable than those of his 
colleagues and more memorable for such rare but vivid images as the 
spray-painting of the Lincoln Memorial in Johnson.  When Stevens was 
asked at his confirmation hearing about his decision to end his essay on 
Rutledge with the Yamashita passage, he responded with graceful modesty: 
“When I wrote that chapter on Mr. Justice Rutledge, I felt that I could not 
improve upon his language at the time it was written and I could not do so 
now.”306  Whether or not Stevens could match Rutledge’s soaring rhetoric, 
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305 Stevens, supra note 12, at 181. 
306 The question was asked by Senator Robert Byrd: “Twenty-nine years have passed since those 
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he has not over his long Court tenure chosen to try. 
IV.  CONCLUSION  
It was literally a stroke of luck—a fortunate coin toss—that sent the 
young John Paul Stevens to the chambers of Justice Wiley Rutledge rather 
than those of Chief Justice Fred Vinson.  Although Stevens, by his own 
account, did not on that day envision a Rutledge clerkship as any more 
appropriate or formative than its alternative, the record of Stevens’s own 
Supreme Court career tells a different story.  Stevens has expressly 
acknowledged that his clerkship year informed the substance of his views 
on judicial oversight of executive action in time of war, an influence 
clearly reflected in his recent opinions in Rasul and Hamdan.  But the 
Rutledge clerkship seems to have informed as well Stevens’s definition of 
his judicial role.  As a prolific author of dissents and concurrences, a 
hands-on author of his own opinions and reviewer of cert petitions, and a 
Justice who welcomes frank discussions—and disagreements—on the law 
with his clerks, Stevens has adapted his own experience in Rutledge’s 
chambers to the demands of a different Court.  This is not to say that 
Stevens has become an ideological ally of Rutledge who, with Frank 
Murphy, occupied his Court’s most liberal wing.  It is one of the ironies of 
Stevens’s current position, one he resists, that he is now perceived as the 
leader of the Roberts Court’s liberal wing, while he continues to describe 
himself as a judicial conservative.  Writing more than half a century ago, 
long before the start of his own judicial career, Stevens praised Rutledge 
for his open-mindedness, his conscience, his unpredictability, and “two 
virtues of a great judge—tolerance and judgment.”307  It is also those 
qualities, admired by the clerk and present in the Justice he has become, 
that continue to link Stevens with Rutledge. 
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